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This capstone memorandum explores the potential for significant nuclear threats across the globe 
to emerge in the 21st century. The current Trump Administration is currently faced with a 
number of volatile nuclear environments particularly in North Korea as well as Russia and their 
recent geo-political encroachments in Eastern Europe. Looking at nearly 50 years of DoD 
nuclear policy planning, this Capstone investigates current opportunities for further nuclear 
modernization and investments to current legs of the nuclear triad that have the potential to deter 
future nuclear escalation.  
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Action Forcing Event 
In response to the growing nuclear threat from North Korea, “The Pentagon has deployed 
high-tech radar to keep watch for a potential North Korean long-range missile launch in the 
coming months, according to a US defense official.” The floating radar, known as the SB-X, is 
based out of Hawaii and is a vital component of the Department of Defense missile defense 
efforts. This latest deployment of US radar technology is in response to North Korea now in the 
process of being able to conduct what would be the country’s first effort to launch a flight tested 
ICBM.1 At the same time, the President-elect recently commented that the “United States must 
strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until as the world comes to its senses regarding 
nukes.”2  
Statement of the Problem-Weaknesses in US Deterrence  
The central problem this analysis seeks to address is that nuclear modernization did not 
accompany new arms reductions as first indicated by the Obama administration. Also, regime 
changes, shifts in leaderships as well as an assortment of global events have contributed towards 
                                                          
1 Choe Hun, "Kim Jong-un Says North Korea Is Preparing to Test Long-Range Missile," The New York Times, 
January 1, 2017, , https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/asia/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-
test-kim-jong-un.html?_r=1 
 





Department of Defense officials to take note of how the international security environment has 
undergone significant shifts.  Historical evidence indicates that the conclusion of the Cold War 
signaled a uni-polar moment often described by political scientists to indicate a period marking 
the United States as the dominant superpower, global political/economic/military force.  
Emerging nuclear development activities, globalization and subsequent advances in military 
technology have led many policymakers as well as military strategists to assume that there has 
been a shift in power again. September 11, 2001, proved to be an event that forever altered the 
international geopolitical landscape.  
In 2013, Russian encroachments into Crimea had sparked a newly invigorated power 
tussle among the two Eastern states. Evan Montgomery a Senior Fellow at the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has noted that “changes in the size and shape of the arsenal 
have important implications for how Washington extends nuclear deterrence to other nations-and 
those changes could have significant consequences if dormant rivalries reemerge, new rivalries 
become more intense, and the conventional military advantages the United States has counted on 
begin to erode.”3  
Current trends are indicating that the United States faces a significant disparity in 
American arms reduction compared to Russian arms reduction. Mark Schneider, a former senior 
official in the Defense Department and current senior analyst at the National Institute of Public 
Policy highlights the inconvenient truth that Russia has since 2010, “increased its deployed 
warheads. Russia has reached 1,735 deployed warheads, an increase of 198 warheads since New 
                                                          
3 Montgomery , Evan . Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2016. 
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START’S EIF when Russia had 1,537 deployed warheads.”4 In an ever increasing volatile 
international environment, deterrence is an important advantage that has the potential to erode 
under current New START measures. The Evidence is showing that New START is pointing 
towards trends of primarily United States nuclear reduction with minimal Russian cooperation in 
reducing their nuclear arsenal. 
By recent delaying of modernization yet still moving forward with subsequent arms 
control reductions the US as well as our strategic allies are vulnerable from a national security 
perspective. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis is a case where American 
qualitative/quantitative missile superiority assisted in combating the Soviet threat of a nuclear 
doomsday. Nonetheless, once the Soviets reached a level of nuclear parity with the United 
States, they placed warheads back in Cuba a decade after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Foreign 
Affairs reported in 1971 that “Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis has been in prospect. Highly placed White House sources indicated that the Soviet Union 
had begun work on a submarine on the Southern Coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which 
could repair and refuel missile firing submarines of the Soviet Navy.”5 Historical evidence 
suggests that when the U.S. and Russia experience both approximate qualitative and quantitative 
parity, there lies increased vulnerability from the U.S.  During 2001, when the Bush 
Administration pledged for increased modernization of missile defense systems, this period was 
eventually followed by both unilateral offensive reductions in arms from both Russia and the 
                                                          
4 Schneider, Mark . "Russia’s Growing Strategic Nuclear Forces and New START Treaty Compliance." National 
Institute for Public Policy , no. 407 (June 21, 2016). http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-407.pdf. 
 




U.S.6 Additionally, the Bush Administrations remarkably aggressive decision to withdraw from 
the ABM treaty was met with future rhetoric from Putin in his desire for further offensive 
reductions.7 
Ultimately, one of the principal goals of New START was bilateral, arms reductions 
between the United States and Russia. However, treaty loopholes effectively negate any potential 
benefit of Russian nuclear downsizing. As Michela Dodge of the Heritage Foundation points out, 
the United States “managed to negotiate a treaty in which the United States bears the majority of 
mandated reductions while Russia is allowed to add deployed nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles to its inventory (and has been doing so). Due to counting rules, nuclear reductions 
border on insignificant and allow Russia to deploy more nuclear warheads than it deployed under 
the 2002 Moscow Treaty that preceded New START.”8 Furthermore, current the structure of the 
New START treaty apparatus does not support the claim that Russia is making a real “Net 
Changes in warhead counts.  
During 2010, US Senate Foreign Relations committee discussion surrounding ratification 
of New START highlights the reality that net Russia is not making significant inroads in nuclear 
reduction based on vague loopholes in the treaty structure. The minority report indicates that 
“New START supposedly establishes a ceiling of 1,550 warheads on strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles. Yet, due to the porous limitations and permissive bomber and other counting rules, that 
would allow unlimited air-launched cruise missiles and could include other uncounted options 
                                                          
6Huntley, Wade, and Mitsuru Kurosawa. Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century. Hiroshima : The 








like sea-launched cruise missiles, there is a distinct possibility that by the end of the ten-year life 
of this treaty Russia will easily have well over 2,000 real—as opposed to accountable— 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and thousands of tactical nuclear warheads.”9 Also, a major 
problem the next administration must factor in is that “decreases in Russian” warheads and the 
notion of nuclear parity with the United States following New START are corrupted the by the 
modernization desires of the Russian Duma. If the United States goal of strategic stability is 
deemed as the basis for New START, Russian motivations to modernize pre-existing nuclear 
forces corrupt the impact of a US/Russia “path to zero”. Nuclear missile trains are a prime 
nuclear capability example of this growing national security concern American policymakers 
will soon face. “Highly valued for their discreet appearance and survivability in the event of an 
attack, these systems were limited under START, and the then-existing Russian system was 
banned in 1993 under START II. These systems, however, are not covered by New START, 
which supersedes START II. ”10 The modernization of what are mostly previously used nuclear 
missile trains, indicate that no matter what reductions ultimately take place through New 
START, modernization loopholes are destructive to maintaining the ultimate American goal of 
strategic stability. As Russia continues to be politically aggravated by NATO allies engaging in 
defense plans to protect the European region, Russian modernization trumps any efforts to create 
a culture of nuclear parity/reduction through New START. During late 2016, President Vladimir 
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov made direct reference to these trends, noting that “Russia is 
doing what is necessary to protect itself amid NATO's expansion toward its borders," Mr. Peskov 
                                                          
9 Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New 
START Treaty),” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 2010, pp. 110-111, available at: <http://foreign. 
senate.gov/treaties/details/?id=1668ace8-5056-a032-526a-29c8fc32e1dc> 
 
10 Dodge, Michela. "New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Time to Stop the Damage to U.S. National Security." 




said.”11 Effectively, New START created a dynamic in which Russia can compromise US 
missile defense systems by taking advantage of treaty language that does not constrain varying 
degrees of modernization. 12 
A cornerstone of the Obama administration push for New START is centered on the idea 
that nuclear forces reductions are met with increased modernization funding. Modernization 
served as a prime motivator for Republican and Democratic bi-partisan support for New START. 
Nonetheless, a July 2016 Washington Post report cited evidence that in the waning months of the 
Obama administration, efforts to push through a ten-year budget proposal for modernization 
were in serious jeopardy of being pushed through. As reported at the time “The administration 
also wants to cut back long-term plans for modernizing the nation’s nuclear arsenal, which the 
Congressional Budget Office reports will cost about $350 billion over the next decade. Obama 
may establish a blue-ribbon panel of experts to examine the long-term budget for these efforts 
and find ways to scale it back.”13  
The impact of failure to implement nuclear modernization post-New START could be 
grave to US national security interests. If continued modernization does not take place while 
being met with further reductions in US arms, a problem could arise in solidifying the efficiency 
and survivability of current remaining US nuclear forces. Survivability is a hair-raising concern 
                                                          




12 Dodge, Michela. "New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Time to Stop the Damage to U.S. National Security." The 
Heritage Foundation. June 20, 2016. http://www.heritage.org/arms-control/report/new-strategic-arms-reduction-
treaty-time-stop-the-damage-us-national-security 
 





when reports are indicating that the nuclear arsenal as of 2014 cost 8.3 billion dollars to 
maintain, more than 30 % on an aggregate basis since the mid-2000s.14  
A May 2016, State Department New START fact sheets highlight arms reductions trends 
among Russian and American ballistic missiles, warheads, and launchers. For example, on 
warheads deployed on ICBM’s, the United States has reduced its warhead count from 2011 New 
START introduction of 1,800 warheads to a May 2016 amount of 1,481 warheads. By contrast, 
Russia has increased its warhead count from 1,537 in 2011 to a May 2016 figure of 1,735.15 As a 
result, this analysis seeks to observe policy solutions for a nuclear deterrence crisis that could 
quickly emerge in the current Donald Trump administration.  Strategic Nuclear Deterrence in its 
broadest sense is defined as the ability to “persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs 
of his proposed action far outweigh any gains that he might hope to achieve.”16 The current US 
posture of deterrence is predicated upon reflecting a sense of overwhelming nuclear force. “It is 
the idea that “nuclear war will be prevented by the threat that any attacker would suffer 
unacceptable retaliation.  Realizing this, the would-be attacker would therefore be deterred.”17 
Further evidence has indicated that the latest round of nuclear negotiations with Russia 
have placed the United States at a disadvantage in achieving what the Obama administration 
aimed for in a path to zero nuclear arms for both Russia and the United States. For example, 
Schneider highlights evidence indicating that “1) the absence of any reductions in deployed 
                                                          
14 Vartabedian , Ralph, and W.J. Hennigan. "Aging Nuclear Arsenal grows even more costly." Los Angeles Times, 
November 8, 2014. 
15 Dodge, Michaela . "New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Time to Stop the Damage to U.S. National Security." 
The Heritage Foundation. June 20, 2016. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/new-strategic-arms-
reduction-treaty-time-to-stop-the-damage-to-us-national-security. 
16 Pifer , Steven , Richard Bush, Vanda Brown, Martin Indyk, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack. "US Nuclear 
and Extended Deterrence ." The Brookings Institution . May 2010. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf. 
17 David Barash , Peace & Conflict Studies , 2nd ed. (Washington , DC: Sage Publications ). 
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warheads or delivery vehicles on the part of Russia; 2) major loopholes, because of counting 
rules as well as the lack of limitations and prohibitions on strategic forces resulting from the 
omission of dozens of important provisions in the START Treaty”18 have created an 
environment free of measurable accountability for Russian arms reduction.  The notion of 
nuclear deterrence focuses on a risk analysis that every administration must address. The 
accurate analysis is not exclusive to if further imbalances in arms reductions will prevent nuclear 
war. Instead, the growing concern is what is the probability that ineffective New START 
reductions measures run the risk of eroding active mutual nuclear deterrence.  
 The scope of the current issues facing American defense policy makers on this issue is 
widespread to international allies and Eastern European state actors. Current New START arms 
reduction measures are failing in regards to the United States ability to deliver effective nuclear 
deterrence to its allies in Eastern European regions. Tactical nuclear weapons are at the center for 
this national security for the new administration. Baker Spring of The Heritage Foundation has 
noted that “New START does not impose any limits whatsoever on tactical nuclear weapons. As 
such, the Russian advantage poses a significant challenge for the U.S. in maintaining a credible 
extended deterrence pol-icy for the benefit of its allies.”19 Also, Vladimir Putin’s decision to 
exercise military force into Crimea calls into question the effectiveness of American’s deterrence 
umbrella spreading to allies.  In his book, The Case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century, 
Brad Roberts cites an uncertain geo-political climate in rising confidence that Russia has in 
penetrating American defense systems. Roberts notes that “some influential Russian experts have 
                                                          
18 Schneider, Mark. “New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation.” National Institute for Public Policy. July, 
2016. http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/New-start.pdf  





concluded that the United States has not, and in the foreseeable future, will not have a strategic 
missile defense system capable of fending off a retaliatory counter-strike…by Russian strategic 
nuclear forces.”20 
 The current administration must address the statistical facts that indicate current arms 
reductions measures under New START provide minimal accountability to Russia and allow the 
United States to lose nuclear advantage leverage that holds obvious ramifications for US and 
allied national security. “On June 1, 2011, the State Department announced that Russia was 
below both the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles: the 
Russians had declared 1,537 and 521, respectively, in the first of the New START data 
exchanges. Thus, Russia will make no reductions in deployed warheads or delivery vehicles due 
to treaty limitations. By contrast, the United States will have to reduce its accountable warheads 
from 1,800 to 1,550 and its deployed strategic delivery vehicles from 882 to 700.”21 Statistics 
indicate that United States deterrence is subsequently undermined due to treaty regulation that 
indicates a net loss for American nuclear advantage. Because Russia already fell below nuclear 
arms limits standards once New START was put in motion, the United States was forced to “to 
reduce unilaterally our forces, such as missiles, bombers, and warheads, in order to meet treaty 
limits. On the other hand, the Russians will actually be allowed to increase their deployed forces 
because they currently fall below the treaty’s limits.”22 
 American leverage in future arms control negotiations is in serious jeopardy as a result of 
New START statistics indicating that the United States depleted over 25 % of its legacy force in 
                                                          
20 Roberts, Brad . The Case for US Nuclear Weapons . Palo Alto , CA: Stanford University Press, 2015.  
21 Schneider, Mark. “New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation.” National Institute for Public Policy. July, 
2016. http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/New-start.pdf 
22 Ibid  
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return for no net losses for Russian strategic legacy nuclear forces.23 In fact, Russian foreign 
policy analysts declared that New START was a major success for Russia. The overarching issue 
at stake is that current New START measures contain measures that have the potential to 
increase Russian nuclear strike capability and further jeopardize the United States as the ultimate 
hegemonic nuclear power. A combination of Russian motivation to modernize nuclear forces 
while the United States appears to engage in unilateral arms reductions is counterproductive to 
establishing a sound deterrence posture. Future disagreements on foreign policy negotiations 
have the potential to go lose ground for American interests with new reports emerging that 
Russia is in the midst of developing a new “silo based liquid fueled missile with a heavy load. 
The missile would be capable of overcoming the future US missile defense.”24 Finally, it is 
worth noting; the Obama administration certainly was intent on cutting nuclear forces. 
Nonetheless, New START ultimately represents a flawed approach that results in “U.S. missile 
defense systems are under intensified attack at a time when the United States and its allies face a 
growing missile threat from rogue states.”25 
 The possession of nuclear arms is critical in the process of which weapons of mass 
destruction can be used to create further diplomat dialogue versus war. The future international 
security landscape may call for a hybrid of sorts where the United States and our allies use a 
combination of tough rhetoric, sanctions as well as nuclear weapons all serving as instruments of 
greater peace. Nuclear weapons, as I see it, represent a form of strength that the United States 
can use to foster higher levels of peace in the futures. The Obama administration implemented 
rhetoric noting the day where there is complete disarmament of nuclear weapons worldwide. The 
                                                          
23 Ibid 
24 Lilly , Bilyana . Russia Foreign Policy Toward Missile Defense . Lexington Books , 2014. 




geopolitical as well as transnational terror presence arguably makes this endeavor unrealistic and 
detrimental to the long-term safety of the United States and our allies. 
 Finally, a major theme behind this analysis is the notion that increased Russian 
advantages in the size of its nuclear arsenal pose a significant risk to the United States in its 
approach in defending European allies from further Russian encroachments. Russian UN 
ambassador has noted that Russia-United States, diplomatic relations are at their worst since 
1973.26 Furthermore, “Nuclear threats of many types will be a major part of Russian pressure on 
the U.S. to accept Russian domination of Eastern Europe and to withdraw missile defense from 
Europe.”27 The intention of New START was for a cooperative, marginalized reduction of 
Russian nuclear forces. Until Putin acknowledges the goal of maintaining a consistent approach 
in nuclear warhead reduction the United States cannot afford to be the sole actor in nuclear force 
reduction. Evidence is showing that New START is pointing towards trends of primarily United 
States nuclear reduction. The intention of the treaty surely is not a unilateral, US reduction 
endeavor. 
 A hallmark of the second nuclear age will be how US policy makers are able to deal with 
the complex issues surrounding extended nuclear deterrence. As noted above, the previous 
Obama administration’s nuclear policy was marked by a vision of a nuclear free world. To what 
extent US policymakers should seek to extend, invest and prioritize the development of the US 
nuclear umbrella will be of major importance to the next administration. Evan Montgomery 
notes in his analysis how “changes in the size and shape of the arsenal have important 
                                                          
26 Somini Sengupta, "A Senior Russian Envoy’s Take on Relations with the United States: ‘Pretty Bad," The New 
York Times, October 17, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/world/vitaly-churkin-russia-united-
states.html?_r=1. 
27 Schneider, Mark. "The Russian Nuclear Weapons Buildup and the Future of the New START Treaty." Real Clear 




implications for how Washington extends nuclear deterrence to other nations-and those changes 
could have significant consequences if dormant rivalries reemerge, new rivalries become more 
intense, and the conventional military advantages the United States has counted on begin to 
erode.”28 
History 
 Dating back to four decades, the United States and Russia have engaged in a variety of 
policy agreements and treaty measures to attempt to reduce each nation’s nuclear arsenal size, 
modernization and subsequent expansion. The genesis of Russian/US strategic nuclear arms 
agreements began in 1969 under SALT 1.29 The conclusion of World War II and the destruction 
levied on Hiroshima as a result of the Atomic Bomb sparked a newly invigorated mindset 
towards which hegemonic force could achieve military prowess. Joseph Stalin ultimately aspired 
to a geo-political strategic balance following WWII. In reality, the use of the Atomic Bomb was 
the first catalyst in a series of souring Russia-US competition over nuclear arms.30  Following 
WWII,  a clear shift in strategy began in which Russia was heavily focused on increases to 
nuclear stockpiles (raw warhead counts), while the United States under the direction of Robert 
McNamara was dedicated to developing advancements in nuclear modernization, including 
missile defense penetrating capable missiles.31  
                                                          
28 Montgomery , Evan . Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2016. 
29 Kimball, Daryl. “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance." Arms Control Association. Accessed 
April 1, 2014. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010. 
30 Stephen J. Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Nuclear Forces 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 7. 
31 Lori Esposito Murray, "SALT I and Congress: Building a Consensus for Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1" 
(Ph.D Diss., Johns Hopkins University: 1989), 65 
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 Dating back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, historical evidence suggests that while 
American numerical superiority has been an advantage for U.S. defense at large, Russian goals 
of modernization to counter quantitative advantages was also an element of the nuclear strategic 
balance of power. In his book, Postwar America: An Encyclopedia of Social, Political Cultural 
and Economics History, James Ciment elaborates on this phenomenon. He notes that after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, “Soviet defense planners worked to achieve parity in nuclear weaponry, 
while the United States sought to maintain its qualitative and quantitative advantages within 
McNamara’s cost-efficiency guidelines.”32 Furthermore, the late 1960’s through the period of 
the origination of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), the US was aware that numerical 
advantages did not always represent an overwhelming deterrent. Signs of Russian modernization 
being capable of trumping US force size were a reality US defense policy makers were 
increasingly aware of. Ciment suggests that “although the United States enjoyed a two to one 
advantage in total strategic warheads and bombs in 1970 (about 4000 to 2000), the Soviets then 
had enough SS-9s for American planners to realize that fighting a limited nuclear war was 
impossible.”33 
 The onset of the Nixon administration, proved to be a landmark moment in real 
significant efforts being made towards, Russian, United States arms control. The previous 
Johnson administration pushed for arms reductions up until the transition of the Nixon 
administration. Interestingly enough, Henry Kissinger in his memoirs notes, he believes that 
Nixon was ultimately purposefully complement in rolling out already prepared arms reductions 
postures from the Johnson administration for a variety of political factors, including Nixon 
                                                          





himself being able to take credit for the assembling of his own unique, US nuclear arms 
reduction posture. 34  
 The Salt I treaty began in 1969 and was eventually ratified in 1972. Under the agreement, 
Russia and the United States each pledged not to “not to construct new ICBM silos, not to 
increase the size of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” and capped the number of SLBM launch 
tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not 
address warhead numbers, leaving both sides free to enlarge their forces by deploying multiple 
warheads (MIRVs) onto their ICBMs and SLBMs and increasing their bomber-based forces. The 
agreement limited the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and 656 SLBM launch tubes.”35  
 An interesting dynamic behind the SALT 1 negotiations revolves around the Nixon 
administration not having a clear bargaining position. As noted by private conversations between 
Nixon and Kissinger throughout a period of time from 1969-1972, public opinion and political 
leverage within Nixon’s own party, shapes his hesitancy towards defining clear American 
foreign policy positions with respect to arms control. For example, archived U.S. department of 
State conversations between Kissinger and Nixon draw insight into this recurring theme leading 
up to Salt 1. Nixon at one point stated to Kissinger his intention for the “the Congress ratify the 
treaty and eventually it will be passed -- or on any problem you face, arms limitation or anything 
that we may talk about with the Soviets, the alliance is, as we say in the United States, the Blue 
Chip, the heart of the defense of Europe and the free world. As far as the Soviets are concerned, 
all their actions are designed to break up that alliance. We shall not fall into that trap. We will 
talk but we won't get trapped. Let us not weaken the alliance. We have to think about what they 
                                                          
34 Kissinger, White House Years, e.g. 29. 
35 Kimball, Daryl. “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance." Arms Control Association. Accessed 
April 1, 2014. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010. 
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want and then look at our alliance and particularly at Germany. We know their aim and are 
keenly aware that we "play the same game".36 
 SALT 1 proved to be a treaty negotiation plagued with institutional red tape. Literature 
reveals Nixon and Kissinger were keenly aware of the complexities surrounding the 
interrelationship between the bureaucratic, agency level (CIA, Pentagon) players in arms control, 
The White House and the soviet government. As noted by Kempfer of Bowling Green State 
University, Nixon was concerned with bureaucratic actors rushing to arms control to fulfill their 
agency focus of rapid arms control. However, Nixon, by not providing explicit goals going into 
Salt 1 talks, was concerned with public and institutional perception of him not being fully open 
to specific arms control reduction amounts. 37  
 Salt 1 provides a basis for understanding the early stages of an issue for deterrence for 
arsenal size superiority for the Russians. For starters, the three year delay from 1969-1972, 
allowed the Russians to vigorously build up nuclear arsenals. 38 While SALT 1 was successful in 
allowing the Soviets and Americans to be motivated towards taking steps to nuclear parity, 
American reluctance to develop policy positions effectively eliminating American advantages in 
MIRV’s (intercontinental nuclear missile carrying several independent warheads). A ban on 
MIRV’s as Raymond Garthoff points out had the potential to hinder future ambitions of 
offensive arms race.39 
                                                          
36 "Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control, 1969-1972." U.S. Department of State 
Archive. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e2/83218.htm. 
37Kempfer, Brian E., "History of Negotiations and Politics of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)" (2013). 
Honors Projects. http://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=honorsprojects 
38 Ibid 
39 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p.22 
16 
 
 Following SALT 1, literature suggests that the Carter administration begins to accelerate 
the fear of implications of reducing effects of the nuclear triad or the SIOP (Single Integrated 
Operational Plan).  Literature suggests “a key issue was the credibility of deterrence, with 
advisers from Kissinger to Brzezinski worried that even the "smaller" SIOP options were so huge 
that they reduced the credibility of deterrence.”40  The Carter administration was focused on 
deviating away from arms reductions talks that were solely centralized in surviving a nuclear 
war. By contrast, the Carter Administration “sought to disabuse the Kremlin of that notion by 
creating "pre-planned" strike options that directly targeted the Soviet leadership.”41  
 Presidential Directive 59 Memorandum, as history has shown, found itself to be one of 
the most controversial elements of the Carter administration in relation to US concerns at the 
time of eroding of deterrence in relation to Russian arsenal size. Among other things, the focus 
of the Carter administration was envisioning scenarios by which the US could jeopardize its 
potential to win nuclear war in the event of a scenario where there are clear Soviet advantages in 
first strike scenarios.42 Carter veers away from MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) in this 
policy oriented document. Furthermore, Carter reiterates that “to continue to deter in an era of 
strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear forces such that in considering 
nuclear aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome 
would represent a victory on any plausible definition of victory.”43  
PD-59 indicated the apprehensions from the Carter administration on the extent to which 
the US should use overwhelming force in retaliatory situations. It is here when American policy 
                                                          
40 Burr, William. "Jimmy Carter's Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified." The National 
Security Archive. September 12, 2012. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/. 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 




regarding retaliation begins to take full shape as Carter instructs in his memo that changes 
needed to be made in how the US responds to warnings of nuclear attacks. As indicated in the 
memo, the authors of PD-59 direct that “while it will remain our (US) policy not to rely on 
launching nuclear weapons on warning that an attack has begun, appropriate pre-planning, 
especially for ICBM’s that are vulnerable to a preemptive attack, will be undertaken to provide 
the president the option of so launching.”44 PD-59 was the first of nuclear policies formed by the 
US, in relation to preserving deterrence that gave the US flexibility to use nuclear options 
beyond just the execution of one massive strike. 
 One key element of the memo, that ultimately had a lasting impact in how the US shaped 
future forces and strike capabilities relates to how the US should respond in the event of failed 
deterrence. Carter directed that “If deterrence failed, the United States "must be capable of 
fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs 
that are unacceptable."45 Central to PD-59, is how Carter’s tactical nuclear posture laid out in 
1980 still serves the basis for policy formulation today. Nonetheless, this posture spawned from 
the basis that the US had qualitative/quantitative nuclear advantages against the Soviets. Carter 
and his national security council were concerned with Soviet ability to survive US nuclear attack. 
As shown in the document, “A key element of PD-59 was to use high-tech intelligence to find 
nuclear weapons targets in battlefield situations, strike the targets, and then assess the damage — 
a "look-shoot-look" capability.”46 
                                                          
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
46 Burr, William. "How to Fight a Nuclear War Revealed: Jimmy Carter's strategy for Armageddon. (We're still using 
it.) ." Foreign Policy, September 14, 2012. 
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1981-2003 marks a period in which transition into Republican leadership had a 
significant impact in the shaping of US nuclear forces and policy with respect to the Soviet 
Union. Ronald Reagan rose to prominence prior to his presidency instilling rhetoric consistent 
with views the US was lagging behind the Soviets in regards to modernization, warhead count 
and technological innovation. At one point during his presidential candidacy, Reagan highlighted 
the flaws of SALT II, strategic arms limitations treaty.47  
Also, “as president, Reagan accelerated strategic nuclear modernization plans and 
launched modern efforts to build a national missile defense system through his Strategic Defense 
Initiative of 1983 (SDI), raising tensions with the Soviet Union and prompting widespread public 
concern about the possibility of war between world’s two major nuclear superpowers.”48 SDI 
proved to be a watershed moment in souring of US-Soviet relations as the nuclear missile 
defense policy, the first of its kind highlights the focus of the Reagan administration on the fear 
of US incapability to retaliate in the event of a Soviet first strike. The program was set to consist 
“of several plans to counter nuclear missiles, including laser beams, which would be mounted on 
satellites in space to shoot down nuclear missiles. A mirror would be used to reflect the beam 
towards the missile.”49 The Reagan administrations in its early stages were largely concerned 
with the concept of an extended nuclear war. In 1981 “he unveiled his plan for a major, strategic 
modernization program to add thousands of additional warheads and a variety of new delivery 
systems to the U.S. arsenal, while improving U.S. command and control capabilities.”50 While 
the Carter administration was very much focused on intelligence gathering means to locate 
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nuclear targets, the early phases of Reagan nuclear posture centered on the belief that Soviet 
nuclear vulnerability would in large part, come as a result a diversified nuclear force size and 
modernity. It was during the Carter administration that Reagan confidently noted: “If the Soviets 
have to compete with us, I’m sure they’ll come running to the table and say wait a minute, 
because they know they can’t.”51 
Undoubtedly, Reagan presided over an explosion in US nuclear arsenal buildup and a 
committed effort to create Russian missile defense programs. Nonetheless, the fall of the Soviet 
Union gave rise to anti-nuclear activists and launched a new wave of US approaches to what 
would follow Reagan’s administration and efforts to launch arms increases. Start I represents the 
next major wave of nuclear reduction efforts made between Russia and the United States. At a 
statistical glance, the treaty, originally proposed in 1982 through the Reagan administration took 
was ratified in 1991. “Like the SALT Treaties negotiated in the 1970s, START I aimed to 
stabilize nuclear deterrence and limit strategic systems (SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks). All the same, the treaty not only limited the number of strategic missiles, it also reduced 
the number of warheads.”52 The geo-political climate following the fall of the Soviet Union 
enabled a confident President George H.W. Bush to feel confident in “dramatically shrinking the 
arsenal of the world’s nuclear weapons.”53 Only after the fall of the Soviet Union could 
subsequent progress be made in nuclear arms reductions.  A failing Russian economy as well as 
promises of continued economic assistance and a desire for Russian democratic capitalism 
created a setting in which President Bush could hold leverage for arms reductions talks. 
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Ultimately START 1 was successful in establishing a sense of continuity for future arms 
reduction talks. However, as reported in the New York Times, “the superpowers will retain 
tremendous firepower, with huge numbers of weapons trained upon each other's principal cities. 
According to one estimate, by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain, the treaty will 
leave 40,000 nuclear warheads capable of prompt usage.”54  
Finally, the very basis for this analysis lies in trends indicating evidence of post-cold-war 
arms control decay. October 2016 marked a significant shift in the problem of continuing arms 
reduction momentum between Russia and the United States. In a decree voiced by Putin, “Russia 
would no longer cooperate with the United States on a 2009 agreement to dispose of weapons-
grade plutonium, Moscow said it would consider reviving the agreement only if the United 
States scaled back its military presence near Russia’s border, lifted all sanctions against Russia, 
and paid Moscow compensation for the economic losses caused by the sanctions.:55 This decree 
further exacerbates the issue of nuclear arsenal imbalance when compared to the United States as 
Putin has sought to seek aggressive stances on modernization and renewal programs intended to 
give Russia leverage over the United States in expanding the types of scenarios nuclear weapons 
could be used. Recent history has indicated that START I arms control agreements originally 
made in the late 1980s have the potential to collapse and put US arms control policy with Russia 
at a volatile state. It has been reported that after taking office for latest term in presidency “Putin 
announced a plan to modernize all three legs of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.”56 
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 The latest rounds of nuclear reductions through New START in 2010 have in part been 
jeopardized by prior US decisions to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. 
Putin has indicated American withdrawal from ABM as a major factor in reluctance to continue 
arms reductions measures under New START through the Obama administration.57 The recent 
Russian annexation of Crimea encapsulates the evolution of the arms control problem the US has 
the potential to face again with Russia. With American pledges to defend NATO allies, and 
Putin’s startling language surrounding his willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of 
Eastern European territory he has claimed as rightfully owned by Russia (Crimea) lies the 
potential for significant implications. US involvement to defend NATO states could endanger 
and eventually enable Putin to withdraw from New START completely. The US then could face 
a conundrum in having warhead stockpiles that fall in comparison to Russia. Subsequently, when 
defending NATO states as well as American home territory from a potential Russian first strike, 
naturally the nuclear deterrence calculus and hegemonic deterrence status the US has becomes 
uncertain.  
Background 
 Nuclear weapons are an integral component to the policies shaping US national security 
and due to increasing geo-political tensions with Russia, will continue to play a massive role in 
deterring a large-scale attack on American citizens.  The current Trump administration will 
undoubtedly arrive at an international security environment that will present opportunities for 
expansion of current nuclear policies such as New START, working to enhance deterrence 
among itself and other nuclear allies, and engage in bilateral legislative dialogue focused on 
                                                          





budget allocations geared towards expediting nuclear modernization programs that will put on 
delay by the former Obama administration.  
 As stated earlier, the Defense Department must acknowledge the signs that a new 
purpose and approach must be initiated in analyzing the previous New START nuclear treaty 
ratified through the Obama administration.  Flawed treaty parameters essentially favored Russia 
in enabling Putin to increase his countries warhead amounts. Conversely, the US bared the brunt 
of actual arms reductions resulting from the 2010 treaty. As noted above, “Russia currently has 
1,796 deployed warheads while the United States is down to 1,368. When New START entered 
into force, the numbers were almost reversed, with the United States having 1,800 deployed 
warheads and Russia 1,537.”58 Much of deterrence is rooted in the perception of force. Current 
geo-political events including the Russian annexation of Crimea, atrocities occurring via the 
undermining efforts of Putin in Syria as well as continued stirred frictions with NATO allies 
have all been accompanied by a climate of nuclear modernization and a willingness to break 
away from New START via recent statements from Putin in the Russian press.  
 In terms of the analysis provided in this analysis, the issue is not exclusively focused to 
New START as a viable treaty for US nuclear deterrence purposes. Rather, the treaty does 
permit the Russian regime to increase warhead numbers, as the treaty has a verification period 
that is scheduled for 2018.59 The background revolving US nuclear posture has been altered 
significantly by today’s current events that ultimately deviate away from the rhetoric provided in 
the Obama Administration 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. It was in that document where the 
                                                          






Obama administration noted that the probability of military as well as nuclear conflict with 
Russia was at its lowest levels dating back to the Cold War. 60 Further actions by Russia since 
the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review have garnered widespread fear and bi-lateral pushes for a 
review of US nuclear policy with respect to Russia. Putin and Russia have been steadfast in 
nuclear modernization efforts to replace previous Soviet Union weapons systems. 61 
Furthermore, “it is also in violation of a whole host of bilateral and international arms control 
treaties, some of which, like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, have profound implications for U.S. allies in Europe. Moscow 
repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons “pre-emptively” against U.S. allies in Europe.”62  
While nuclear asymmetry is a vital aspect of future nuclear deterrence policy with Russia, 
there are an array of other issues related to verification programs in which the Russians have the 
potential to develop nuclear superiority through falsified verification reports and deceptions in 
arsenal size when hosting inspections.  Experts have referenced how “monitoring compliance 
with this prohibition is challenging and the potential for using denial and deception to hide the 
number of warheads is clearly present. Based largely on the acquisition of telemetry data from 
the Russians, data needed to verify Russian compliance could be denied to the U.S. 
government.”63  Current, political shakeups along the Baltic States including the annexation of 
Crimea reveal a Russian attitude that is perpetuated by Putin as a moral obligation to make 
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amends on the perceived losses of hegemonic influence stripped away upon the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  
 High level security debates have the potential to be altered, shaped and influenced from 
public opinion/perception.  A major theme coming out of the 2016 general election between 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump was the ability of the Russian government to shape the 
political process in the United States. Otherwise known as “information warfare”, Russia’s 
attempts to bully nations around the world through false propaganda’s are a cause for concern.64 
The information warfare tactics are all part of a broad plan developed by Putin intended to utilize 
subversive tactics that “are aimed not only at Europe but also at the United States, where they 
threaten to destabilize the political order.”65  Prior to President Obama departing the White 
House, his administration laid out a near trillion dollar budget package aimed at setting forth a 
sweeping set of renewal programs aimed at modernizing the US nuclear arsenal over the span of 
thirty years.66 An interesting dynamic of that modernization program proposed by Obama is the 
consistent levels of discourse among internal Democratic leadership as well as Republicans all 
pointing towards varying opinions on the need for US nuclear modernization reform.   
A 2016, audio of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at a fundraising 
event in Mclean, Virginia highlights the varying views on U.S. nuclear modernization among 
both major political parties. Speaking to the group in a 50 minute audio, Clinton was heard 
remarking that the Obama proposal for a trillion dollar modernization program, including 
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warheads, submarines and bombers as “one of the most dangerous developments imaginable.”67 
In particular, the Obama administration plans for the modernizing of an improved cruise missile 
have even come under fire from previous Secretary of Defense William J. Perry who served 
under former President Clinton from 1994-1997. In a Washington Post, op-ed, Perry cited the 
works of then British Defense Secretary Phillip Hammond who voiced his opposition to the 
modernizing program stating that “A cruise-based deterrent would carry significant risk of 
miscalculation and unintended escalation. At the point of firing, other states could have no way 
of knowing whether we had launched a conventional cruise missile or one with a nuclear 
warhead. Such uncertainty could risk triggering a nuclear war at a time of tension.”68  
Signs have shown across both political aisles voicing support for reformed arms control 
measures, beyond the current New START treaty apparatus. Obama has left modernization to his 
successor, Trump. Nonetheless, Democrats and Republicans have both been shown to be 
skeptical of modernization in determining whether or not quantitative/qualitative measures are 
effective in today’s foreign policy relationship with Russia.  During her 2016 campaign, Mrs. 
Clinton pondered on modernization noting: “Do we have to do any of it? Mrs. Clinton asked. If 
we have to do some of it, how much will we have to do?”69 
Another sect of public opinion, specifically within the defense community of policy 
makers has voiced concerns that modernization efforts of the U.S. are teetering on dangerous 
implications giving recent developments of Russia’s sea launched cruise missile.  Varying 
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perspectives in the defense community contend that American sea-based nuclear missiles are 
lagging behind Russia and provided an opening for Russian nuclear advantage. Clark Murdock 
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that “the decision to retire TLAM-N 
(fleet defense missiles) was reportedly based in part on safety and cost concerns, but restoring 
some similar sea-based capability may prove desirable in the longer term.”70 These 
developments provide insight into potential current weaknesses in U.S. modernization efforts 
and their impact on deterrence given the current Russian spy ships encroaching on waterways 
along the American east coast as well as the February 2017 Russian deployment of ground 
launched cruise missiles inside Russia, “a violation of a 1987 treaty between the US and Russia 
that banned ground-launched intermediate range missiles.”71  
Nancy Gallagher of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (1996) provides 
defense policy makers with insights on public opinion of post-Cold-War arms control. In her 
analysis, Gallagher generalizes that “Despite the deterioration of US-Russian strategic relations 
at the leadership level, the citizens of the two countries place a high priority on joint efforts to 
prevent proliferation and other forms of security cooperation.”72 An interesting portion of 
research at AIDD (Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy) has been analysis on public 
opinion of international arms control. With respect to the U.S. and Russia, Gallagher asserts that 
“One sequence of questions started by asking about the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (SORT), which committed the US and Russia to reduce their number of operationally 
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deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 2,200 by the end of 2012. Eighty-eight percent of 
Americans and 65 percent of Russians supported this agreement, with only 11 percent and 15 
percent respectively opposed.”73 This finding is a key factor for current defense policy makers to 
take into account, as contrary to belief among conservative as well as some liberal think tank, 
circles, studies such as Gallagher’s reveal that citizens of both respective countries are in support 
of reducing arsenal sizes to the levels of other allied nation-states.74 Evidence has shown that 
defense policy makers have not hesitated in deviating away from overwhelming public opinion 
in prior administrations, specifically on nuclear testing via the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
of 1996. The U.S. has signed but not formally ratified the treaty. However, as highlighted by the 
works of AIDD, “Interestingly, when we asked Americans, "do you think the US does or does 
not participate in the treaty that prohibits nuclear weapon test explosions world-wide", 56 
percent incorrectly thought that the United States does participate, while only 37 percent knew 
that the United States has so far refused to ratify the Treaty.”75 
 There are a variety of principal players worthy of mention of who will play an integral 
role in the shaping of defense policies affecting the status of modernization and arms controls 
with Russia. Newly elected and 45th president Donald J. Trump arrives to the White House with 
an opportunity to shape a new vision for US nuclear policies. Trump arrives to the White House 
already deemed as a “loose cannon” on his fluctuating and often vague stances on issues 
regarding defense policy. However, it cannot be understated the already strong language on the 
current and future U.S. nuclear force posture already adopted in the first several weeks of the 
Trump administration. The Washington Post made reference to a recent Trump tweet “that 






offered no details, Trump said, “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its 
nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.”76 Trump’s 
remarks come in response to additional strong rhetoric from the Kremlin, in which Putin doubled 
down on potentially inflammatory rhetoric whereby he acknowledges that Russia “needs to 
strengthen the military potential of strategic nuclear forces, especially with missile complexes 
that can reliably penetrate any existing and prospective missile defense systems.”77  
Trump has expressed his recent disapproval of wasteful costs associated with the F-35 
fighter jet. However, he will have to employ his own judgement on many experts regard as 
astronomical, potentially wasteful spending of upwards of a trillion dollars on modernization of 
the nuclear triad. The Heritage Foundation will undoubtedly play a vital role in how the Trump 
Administration gathers information to formulate nuclear policy. As stated earlier, Michele Dodge 
of The Heritage Foundation is one of the leading voices in opposition to the Obama 2010 
Nuclear Posture Report that asserted that tensions with Russia have since calmed since the 
conclusion of the Cold-War. Dodge notes that a failure to keep up with Russian modernization is 
a recipe for nuclear asymmetry with consequences in particular for NATO allies. “Dodge has 
called for the incoming Trump administration to spend more on its nuclear weapons program. 
She also said that the United States should withdraw from nonproliferation treaties that have not 
worked and consider resuming nuclear test explosions, the last of which was conducted in 
1992.”78 
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 A key revelation coming out of the Trump administration is the “wildcard” that is 
recently appointed Secretary of Defense Mattis and his disagreements with Trump over key 
policy making officials at DoD. Specifically, Mattis was highly interested in selecting outgoing 
Obama Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Making Michelle Flourony. Mattis and Trump 
reportedly clashed over key Pentagon appointments being brought forth without his final 
approval.79 Mattis was highly considering Flourony, a former Obama appointee withheld great 
admiration for.80 While Flourony ultimately withdrew herself from consideration for a position 
in the Trump administration, she will undoubtedly be a strong outside player and source of 
guidance for Mattis regarding various matters of national security, defense and nuclear policy. 
Flourony has joined other strong Democratic nuclear policy thinkers in their assessment that the 
United States needs a ““safe, secure, and responsive nuclear weapons R&D and production 
infrastructure to ensure a durable and credible deterrent” which will “require refurbishing the 
current aging weapons complex,” the Democratic party signatories concluded “there is no 
urgency to proceed with the administration’s RRW program or any other alternative to the long-
standing SSP [Stockpile Stewardship Program] to assure the continuing safety and reliability of 
U.S. nuclear weapons.”81  
 R. James Woolsey is another significant player in nuclear policy formulation. Now an 
advisor to President Trump on national security, Woolsey, a Democrat formerly served as 
Direction of Central Intelligence Agency as well as a delegate at large during U.S.-Soviet 
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Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START).82 Woolsey has indicated Trump’s willingness to 
slow down tough rhetoric on future arms with Russia. Rather Woolsey has asserted Trump is 
correct on calls to double down on modernization. In a recent interview, Woolsey is noted as 
saying regarding Trump’s comments, "I think he's right because we have been degrading our 
nuclear capability over the last eight years.”83 
Policy Proposal 
 Throughout the history section of this analysis, observers of U.S. nuclear policy could see 
how during the post-Cold War Era, much of arms reductions policy planning, as well as 
international treaty involvement could be done from a position of American advantage. In a 
December 2016, Politico Op-Ed, Matthew Kroenig asserts that “For decades, the United States 
was able to reduce its nuclear arsenal from Cold War highs because it did not face any plausible 
nuclear challengers. But great power political competition has returned, and it has brought 
nuclear weapons, the ultimate instrument of military force, along for the ride.”84 Following the 
international backlash Putin received for the Russian invasion of Crimea, the Russian leader was 
quoted as stating his goal was to “enhance the combat capability of strategic nuclear forces, 
primarily by strengthening missile complexes that will be guaranteed to penetrate existing and 
future missile defense systems.”85 The bedrock of future American nuclear policy proposals in 
relation to Russia has the potential to enhance deterrence by making advancement to current US 
Nuclear force structure strength. As noted by Kroenig, “The United States needs a robust nuclear 
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force, therefore, not because anyone wants to fight a nuclear war, but rather, the opposite: to 
deter potential adversaries from attacking or coercing the United States and its allies with nuclear 
weapons of their own.”86  
 As commonly noted, the priority of the United States President is to protect American 
citizens of all foreign enemies. This analysis seeks to offer a policy proposal that advises the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policymaking to advocate for a policy double down on previous 
Obama administration nuclear modernization program proposals while continuing to maintain 
the status quo on the Russia-United States New START treaty of 2010. Also, the Obama 
administration prior to leaving office pondered the possibility of exercising the executive 
authority of the President to implement a new, U.S. no first strike policy with respect to use of 
nuclear weapons.87 The use of a two-part policy in which the U.S. defense department commits 
to upgrading the nuclear triad, excluding a nuclear cruise missile, as well as a new posture on no 
first strike usage has the potential to foster new levels of geo-political peace worldwide.  
 The first component of this policy would be to issue an Executive Order stating that the 
U.S. is adopting a “No Nuclear First Strike” policy.  In short, this policy “would allow the 
United States to launch nuclear weapons only if the enemy deployed them first. Such a change 
would be a dramatic policy shift: Washington has always kept the option of a preemptive strike 
on the table."88The aim of such a policy would be to alter the landscape of the U.S. posture and 
rules of nuclear engagement with which the U.S. would use as its basis for potential nuclear 
conflict. As noted by Dominic Tierney of The Atlantic, “The policy reflects the power to set the 
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rules of war, rather than some wayward pacifist ideal to end all war. Countries that issue no-first-
use pledges boast strong conventional militaries. These states want to encourage a model of war 
where their army meets the enemy on a conventional battlefield with clearly defined rules—the 
kind of war, in other words, that they usually win.”89 
 Secondly, this proposal calls for the President and Defense Department authorize full- 
scale modernization of U.S. nuclear forces.  The proposal would spend approximately $ 300 
billion dollars on modernizing the following systems over the next 30 years. Nuclear Submarine 
modernization funding should expect to receive close to $130 billion dollars in funding, while 
new bombers will cost close to $ 90 billion and finally a new fleet of ICBM’s would receive 
approximately 85 billion dollars in funding.  These figures are derived from previous Obama 
Administration modernization proposals guided under Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.90 As 
noted earlier, a double down on previous efforts of President Obama and his military advisers to 
modernize the nuclear triad serve as the basis for creating an environment of further arms 
reductions talks beyond New START. Ash Carter in January 2017 described the expectation that, 
"Over the next two decades, I expect the total cost of nuclear modernization to be approximately 
$270 billion. Although this presents a long-term affordability challenge for DoD, I believe we 
must fund the enterprise to ensure that our nuclear deterrent continues to provide the President 
options and remains as safe, secure, and reliable as it is today." This policy proposal calls for 
specifically potential modernization and replacement of the Minuteman III ICBM, New ICBM 
(GBSD), a modernization of the B-2 Bomber, a modernized B-21 strike bomber, as well as a 
replacement to the current 14-submarine fleet of Ohio-class nuclear submarines.  
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President Trump and the Defense Department have the opportunity to preserve long- 
standing traditions of nuclear stability by amending the Obama modernization program and 
building on policy recommendations previously recommended by Stephen Young, a senior 
fellow for Human Rights at the State Department that calls for the removal of Nuclear Cruise 
missiles as part of the modernization package.  Removal of the LRSO cruise missile component 
of the below Obama modernization plan would “lay the groundwork for eliminating this 
destabilizing class of nuclear weapons globally. Long-range, stealthy, high-speed nuclear-armed 
cruise missiles are a nightmare, one that the United States does not need and one the government 
should do everything it can to prevent other countries from obtaining.” By excluding the 
production of a new set of nuclear LRSO cruise missiles, fiscal budgets required to complete a 
modernization package by FY 2044 would cost approximately $ 300 billion dollars for a 30 year 
modernization window proposed in this policy. This policy proposal takes into account that fears 
of a trillion dollar modernization program would be wasteful and counter to US deterrence goals. 
Current numerical figures being widely supported in defense circles as well as the current Joint 
Chief of Staff are straying from the previous $1 Trillion modernization figure commonly 
associated with the Obama administration proposals.  A $1 trillion figure is closely aligned with 
CBO reports which focus not exclusively on acquisition costs but rather “the cost to field, 
operate, maintain, and modernize U.S. nuclear forces.”91 Air Force spokesman, Capt. Mark 
Graff, told CNBC a more precise figure the government is using for the nuclear recapitalization 
(or modernization) is about $270 billion over more than 20 years.”92 In addition, the elements of 
the nuclear triad mentioned above represent modernization to what in various defense circles 
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estimate as the most vulnerable elements of the nuclear triad. For example, the modernization of 
ground elements of the nuclear triad, in the form of a new ground-based Minuteman III, is 
already reportedly a top priority for current Secretary of State Mattis.93 Also, the development of 
a new class of submarines is an urgent matter noted by the Arms Control Association, as “the 
service lives of the Navy’s 14 Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are being 
extended.”94 
Specifically, the goal of this policy is to remain steadfast in working towards nuclear 
parity with Russia through New START from a warhead count standpoint while also preserving 
the American commitment to maintaining the strongest nuclear deterrent worldwide.  Nuclear 
parity for this analysis relates to total number of US and Russian net warhead figures. Fears of 
whether Russia will eventually reach the caps they promised to reach by 2018 are valid, as noted 
throughout this analysis.  Nonetheless, the expectation is that by February 5, 2018, as stated in 
New START both the U.S. and Russia will meet the aggregate warhead limits laid out. These 
limits include: 
• “700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for 
nuclear armaments; 
• 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is 
counted as one warhead toward this limit); 
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• 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.”95 
  An effective proposal to modernize the current US nuclear arsenal ultimately has the 
potential to outweigh and eliminate any strategic advantages Russia may seek to have from a 
quantitative standpoint if Putin decides to not abide by New START parameters. As reported by 
the Brookings Institution, “parity with Russia matters less today in strategic terms. In 2012, the 
Pentagon stated that even if Russia built up nuclear forces that exceeded New START’s limits, 
strategic stability would be maintained due to the secure U.S. second-strike capability, based 
primarily on SLBMs on submarines at sea.”96  
The chart below, from the Arms Control Association, provides a visual graphic of the 
acquisition costs of a 30 year, $240-250 billion dollar Modernization plan, originally proposed 
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An upgrade to the current US nuclear triad is based upon the fundamental argument laid 
out in this analysis that “the United States’ arsenal should be designed to provide robust 
deterrence in the most difficult of plausible circumstances: during a conventional war against a 
nuclear armed adversary.”98 A major reality is that as US conventional forces continue to 
become the dominating global force, further incentives for adversaries to resort to nuclear tactics 
during times of conventional war become an enhanced reality. As stated in previous 
modernization proposals by the Obama administration, it is recommended that the current Trump 
Administration consider a proposal that “hose proposals include funding nuclear infrastructure 
(that is, the complex of national laboratories, production facilities, and personnel), extending the 
                                                          




life of aging warheads, and replacing old delivery systems.”99 Furthermore, this modernization 
proposal offers a proposal which would enable the Defense Department to work with the Trump 
administration on focusing on ways to enhance the lowest yield, most accurate nuclear 
capabilities the U.S. can develop for the future. One way of achieving this accuracy goal through 
future modernization is following through on previous Obama era ambitions of “seeking funding 
for a nuclear-capable version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and a nuclear-capable long-range 
bomber to replace the B-52 and B-2 bombers. Most noteworthy, the administration supports a 
modernization plan that would convert all remaining B-61 nuclear bombs into a single, low-yield 
version with increased accuracy.”100 Finally, an additional aspect of this proposal is a 
modernization of the current nuclear submarine fleet the U.S. currently possesses. Future arms 
reductions will create a necessity for submarines to host a new era of modernized missiles.  
Double down on plans to modernize the Ohio-Class fleet could provide an option for “retaining 
the smaller U.S. arsenal's survivability.”101 
This policy proposal is hinged on accomplishing a fundamental strategic goal of staying 
on a path to further nuclear disarmament while also maintaining the US position as the 
hegemonic global nuclear force. Former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker touches 
on the goal of this type of policy. In an October 2016, New York Times op-ed, Rademaker 
reiterates a “fundamental strategic reality: the deeper the cuts to America’s nuclear arsenal, the 
greater the need for confidence in the reliability of our remaining weapons. This is particularly 
                                                          






true as Russia and China press forward with robust nuclear modernization programs.”102  To 
reiterate, the ultimate end goal of this policy proposal is that by remaining to continue US 
commitment to New START warhead parameters, the U.S. continues on a path of arms reduction 
with Russia while maintaining an ultimately more powerful and robust nuclear force through 
modernization.  In addition, changing the course of U.S. policy through a no first strike policy 
lays the groundwork towards future arms control reduction talks to take place between the two 
parties. 
 Policy Authorization/Implementation  
Nuclear modernization carries a unique set of policy authorization tools. Firstly, an 
upgrade to the current arsenal of the nuclear triad is based on not violating the current New 
START treaty which as mentioned throughout this analysis places a cap on U.S. and Russian 
warhead limits. However, those treaties do not contain language regarding modernization of the 
current U.S. arsenal. Obama garnered bi-partisan support for New START by leaving room for 
future nuclear modernization. It was noted that “As part of his effort to win Republican support 
for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010, President Obama 
submitted to lawmakers a 10-year plan to maintain and modernize US nuclear warheads, 
strategic delivery systems, and their supporting infrastructure.”103  To initiate large-scale 
spending on defense upgrades to various legs of the nuclear triad, a formal budget must be 
submitted to Congress. The President is responsible for assembling a budget that he ultimately 
proposes to Congress for approval. Concerning budgetary requests, for nuclear modernization, 
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this would specifically be handled through the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal 
year of the budget request.104 The Trump Administration can seek the assistance of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a congressional budget request relating 
specifically to “weapons activities”.105 Congress is ultimately responsible for authorizing each 
fiscal year defense budget. Furthermore, “The federal budget process occurs in two stages: 
appropriations and authorizations. This is an appropriations bill, which sets overall spending 
limits by agency or program. (Authorizations direct how federal funds should or should not be 
used.) Appropriations are typically made for single fiscal years (October 1 through September 30 
of the next year).”106  
With respect to implementing a new policy of no U.S. nuclear first strike use, an 
executive action is an option with which President Trump is already familiar and comfortable.  
The Executive authority provides an effective and legal authorization tool that President Trump 
can utilize to alter the current U.S. nuclear posture. It is important to note that the President’s 
authority specifically from a defense perspective is already very limited by congressional checks. 
These include for example “power to declare war, raise and support the armed forces, make rules 
(i.e., laws) for the regulation of the armed forces, and provide for calling forth the militia of the 
several states.”  Nonetheless, as the U.S. chief military commanders, presidential power is still 
open to interpretation via the Constitution specifically when it comes to handling the size and 
scope of military programs, assets, and personnel. These include situations “in which Congress 
has not acted to declare war.”   A vast majority of presidential directives fall under a category of 
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statements that “includes documents with written instructions from the President to executive 
branch officials on how they are to carry out their duties.”  Finally, previous presidents have 
utilized the power of the presidency to implement executive action in regards to executive action. 
For example, Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12059 relating to functions surrounding 
nuclear non-proliferation.  In short, a combination of executive authority and constitutional 
authority allow the president to pursue legally this type of adjustment to a no first use policy 
stance. 
Regarding policy implementation tools, because a “no first use” policy as well 
modernization are not policies aimed at influencing citizen behavior, sermons are a viable source 
of policy implementation strategies.  For example, as seen in 2010, the Obama Administration 
“spelled out its vision of modernization through the course of 2010.  In February, soon after the 
release of the President’s budget, the Vice President gave a major address at the National 
Defense University in which he highlighted the need to invest in our nuclear work force and 
facilities.”107 Information relayed to the public is a powerful way of garnering public support for 
proposed policies in the next administration. President Trump has shown to rely heavily on a 
variety of sermons methods to reiterate his policy goals. A March 2017 joint message to 
Congress laid out specific policy goals President Trump envisioned for his administration. 
Absent from this joint message was any specific discussion of nuclear policy. Future speeches to 
Congress could be used specifically to relay the political and economic pros of pursuing a no 
first use posture while pushing forward on wide-scale modernization. “Information as a public 
policy instrument covers government-directed attempts at influencing people through a transfer 
of knowledge, communication of reasoned argument, and moral suasion to achieve a policy 
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result.”108 The current Trump administration has powerful tools at its disposal to use sermons 
expressed in the past as a “path towards nuclear zero” to maintain support for a strengthening of 
current forces while pursuing policies that provide the foundation for future arms cuts.  President 
Trump would need to engage strong sermon campaign specifically as it relates to no first use 
policies. Former President Obama decided against such a formal declaration as it would have 
severe diplomatic ramifications for relationships with Japan and South Korea. According to 
White House sources, outgoing Secretary of State reiterated to President Obama “that a no first 
use pledge would also weaken the nuclear deterrent while Russia is running practice bombing 
runs over Europe and China.”109 
Policy Analysis 
With respect to a proposal for heightened levels of nuclear modernization, a major 
question arises as follows: Why do we need modernized nuclear weapons systems to continue 
worldwide deterrence? Secondly and more importantly, from an effectiveness analysis 
standpoint, how exactly will modernization to our current nuclear forces foster or cultivate a 
greater sense of nuclear stability between Russia and the U.S.? Nuclear stability varies 
depending on the nature of the deterrence threat. Keith Payne of the National Institute of Public 
Policy notes that “the threat environment sets deterrence requirements, and the contemporary 
threat environment is particularly demanding because it is both severe and highly dynamic.”110 
Literature suggests that the U.S. defense department was acting logically in avoiding 
modernization in the immediate post-Cold-War aftermath. Following the Cold-War, “The 
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Warsaw Pact suddenly disbanded, the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, and Wilson won his 
nearly century-long ideological struggle with Lenin. Virtually everywhere, collectivism and 
centralization gave way to democracy and decentralization.”111 Advocates of nuclear 
disarmament following the Cold-War argued a path towards “zero” was the logical step as the 
U.S. would still be able to maintain a conventional superiority worldwide. In his book Nuclear 
Disarmament: Obstacles to Banishing the Bomb, Jozef Goldblat highlights the consensus within 
policy circles that U.S. conventional superiority would serve as the foundation of nuclear 
disarmament. “Indeed, many American advocates of complete nuclear disarmament argue that 
this action should be taken because it would result in unassailable worldwide military supremacy 
of the United States through it conventional forces.”112  Nonetheless, the broader definition of 
nuclear stability has changed today given new shifts in the geo-political climate. The nuclear 
threat has now shifted to not only include threats to the U.S. but to regional, non-nuclear states. 
This analysis is of the view that nuclear stability is the no use of any nuclear weapons by any 
state, as well as the prevention of any other non-current nuclear states from acquiring nuclear 
arms. This is evident in Russia’s recent ambivalent attitude towards mutually assured 
destruction. Rather, “Russia’s doctrine today is not a replay of “stable” mutual deterrence or 
NATO’s flexible response doctrine. No, it includes nuclear coercion based on selective nuclear 
first-use threats in non-nuclear contingencies.”113 Multiple strains of thought regarding the 
potential for or inability of nuclear modernization to effectively foster deterrence to Russia are 
presented in this analysis. Robert Scher, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, 
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Plans, and Capabilities, has noted that “It is clear that other countries will continue to possess 
nuclear weapons well past the service lives of our existing systems, which have already been in 
use decades longer than originally planned. Modernization is thus essential to the President’s 
commitment to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear 
weapons exist.”114  
Those who argue for modernization cite the age of our current nuclear triad as major 
concern in delivering effective nuclear deterrence to Russia. Stephen Rademaker, former 
Assistant Secretary of State from 2002-2006 has noted that “The average age of our B-52 
bombers is 52 years, of our intercontinental ballistic missiles 35 years, and our nuclear 
submarines 24 years. None of these systems were built to last forever. All three legs of the 
nuclear triad — strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles — need to be upgraded.”115 As stated earlier in this policy proposal, nuclear 
modernization is the center piece of US commitment towards a path of future arms reductions 
and global nuclear disarmament. One goal of modernization is creating a level of U.S. 
dominance that fosters a greater ability for arms reductions to occur not out of desperation but 
out of U.S. direction and leverage.  There are many who advocate that nuclear modernization’s 
effectiveness is measured in what is the perception of setting the stage or security climate for 
future arms reductions. Kroenig states in his research how “all states should  work to reduce 
international tensions so that disarmament might be achieved in the future.  If and when security  
threats are reduced sufficiently, nuclear draw- downs  will  easily  follow.  But  in  the meantime,   
                                                          
114 Scher, Robert . "Nuclear Modernization: Is it needed and can we afford it?" Center for Strategic and 
International Studies . 2016. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/event/ASD%20Scher%20Modernization%20Remarks_0.pdf. 





simply   allowing   the   US arsenal to rust away will not meaning-fully   affect   chances   for   
eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide.”116 
Supporters of modernization argue that upgrades beginning today are effective in 
delivering deterrence in the wake of recent Russian annexation of Crimea. The argument is that 
recent Eastern European aggressions are indicators that the potential for immediate reductions 
following the expiration of New START are bleak. Nonetheless, counter to this argument is the 
view from several detractors of modernization who note that the U.S. maintained a significant 
nuclear superiority over the USSR during multiple timeframes before the Cold-War, yet that did 
not deter Russia from invading Czecholovakia (68). In their book, International Ethics Defense, 
Lawrence A. Alexander and Larry Alexander cite trends showing how the USSR was not 
deterred by U.S. nuclear advantages in any of their Warsaw pact hostilities and subsequent 
invasions. The authors note that “The effectiveness of nuclear threats as a deterrent to Soviet 
aggression or Communist expansion was and remains barely credible…The threat to use nuclear 
weapons did not prevent the subversion pf Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, the collapse 
of Chiang Kai-Shek, the fall of Dienbienphu, or the invasion of Hungary, all of which occurred 
before the Soviet Union could effectively deter an American nuclear strike with nuclear weapons 
of its own.”117  
Commentators have asserted that “the Ukraine crisis seems likely to further slow the 
arms-control process. And, in general, the relatively sluggish reduction rate suggests that U.S. 
and Russian arsenals are not so much headed toward zero as plateauing for the foreseeable 
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future.”118 Direct evidence shows that from a pure modernization standpoint, U.S. options to 
modernize at the very least maintain a level playing field from a capability standpoint. While not 
necessarily expanding our arsenal, a U.S. advantage in modernization counters already reported 
Russian efforts to modernize. It is reported that Russia “is developing three new land-based 
missiles, including an SS-27 intercontinental ballistic missile modified so it can carry multiple 
warheads that can be aimed at different targets, thereby expanding the lethality of each missile. 
Its ballistic submarines are also set to be modernized, with eight new subs that reportedly will be 
able to launch 16 missiles, each capable of carrying up to six independently targetable 
warheads—again increasing the number of targets that can be attacked.”119 Proponents of 
modernization argue for effectiveness noting that advancements in the current arsenal are vital to 
the U.S. second strike capabilities. For example, “If the U.S. were to eliminate its entire nuclear 
arsenal, armed states like Russia would utilize nuclear stockpiles as leverage to coerce or attack 
the U.S. and its allies. The best way to complicate the calculus of Russia (or that of any rogue 
nation that desires to launch a nuclear attack) is by boosting missile defenses of the U.S. 
homeland and maintaining an assured second-strike capability.”120  
The preservation of peace, while abstract in theory, can still represent a real and tangible 
metric in the number of nuclear-armed states that may or may not arise as a result of U.S. failure 
and or success in nuclear modernization goals. The goal of modernization in this policy is to 
create an environment that pressures Russia to come back to the negotiating table for further 
arms reductions talks. Proponents of modernization argue that the less nuclear capable states 
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there are, the greater the chance future successful arms talks/cuts from Russia can bear fruition. 
In his research, Evan Montgomery has reiterated that “the United States could actually become 
more reliant on nuclear weapons due to a confluence of factors. Most importantly, additional 
regional powers might acquire nuclear weapons or the ability to produce them. As a result, 
Washington cold take on extra security commitments to discourage those nations from 
committing acts of aggression.”121 Particularly as it relates to NATO allies, the U.S. has been 
able to extend the nuclear deterrence umbrella post-Cold-War while managing to keep the 
number of nuclear powers since 1991 at a relatively stable state.  
Forecasting is a significant policy analysis tool the Trump administration will have in 
building support for the effectiveness of modernization. Defense analysts highlight that 
modernization is effective in countering Russian reluctance to future Arm’s cuts. “The U.S. 
government in 2014 announced that Russia had violated the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range. (U.S. 
allies in Europe and Asia want to see the treaty preserved.)122 Proponents of nuclear 
modernization contend that upgrades to U.S. air, sea bomber capabilities in turn cause a net 
reduction in the amount of Eastern European allies seeking nuclear capabilities themselves. As a 
result, deterrence is enhanced while eliminating further regional instability. “If America’s 
extended deterrence did not reassure allies, more countries in Europe would likely have nuclear 
weapons to deter Russian threats and attacks, especially with Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and 
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its recent liberal threats of employing nukes.”123 This also relates directly to a policy analysis 
lens of technological capacity. A benefit of moving forward with modernization makes 
negotiating with Russia more likely because modernization of all legs of the triad makes 
technological capacity of all elements of the triad strategically advantageous against the Russian 
who still face major lags in their innovative process to several of their delivery and missile 
systems.124 
Equality is often a tool used in measuring potential positive effects of public policy. 
Nuclear modernization is undoubtedly an appropriate setting to observe the effects of U.S. 
modernization on the concept of parity, strength and fairness in achieving nuclear policy goals. 
As alluded to in previous sections of this analysis, Russia has consistently been observed as 
using New START treaty loopholes to their advantage. History indicates that “the  Soviet  Union  
and  its  successor  state  Russia  have  consistently  violated  their  arms  control  treaty  
obligations  and  formal  pledges  since  the  beginning  of  modern  arms  control  in  1972… 
Most  of  the  strategic  weapons  Russia  has  today  violate  its  legal  obligations,  political  
commitments  or  U.S. interpretation of  previous  agreements.  This  includes  the  SS-18  mod  
5,  the  SS-25,  and  the  MIRVed  version  of  the  SS-27  missiles.  The  same  will  likely be 
obvious when the New START Treaty expires in 2021 (or 2026 if it is extended).”125 The 
nominal strategic advantage the U.S. may carry in the wake of absent modernization efforts 
could be misleading. From an equality standpoint, modernization has the potential to afford 
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Eastern European equal levels of deterrence under the American Nuclear umbrella. Observers 
have stated that “New  START is having no impact on Russian nuclear force modernization and 
Russia has decided to increase  its  forces  to  the  New  START  levels.    Actual force  levels  
could  be  higher  than  the  notional New START limits on warheads and delivery vehicles 
because so many things do not count under New START and bomber weapons are 
discounted.”126   
Modernization of the fleet of current Ohio-class nuclear submarines is critical in 
forecasting an Eastern European region of which finds itself in a volatile climate. One significant 
advantage, modernization to the current U.S. nuclear submarine fleet provides is that it 
effectively may instill new levels of deterrence to Russia without having to distribute nuclear 
weapons directly into the hands of allied nations. Deterrence as noted throughout this analysis is 
rooted in instilling a sense among Russia that the U.S. has the ability to survive and provide 
overwhelming consequences in the wake of our second strike capabilities. Instead of relying on 
the nuclear response capabilities of allied regions in Eastern Europe, a strong fleet of submarines 
serves as an effective to ongoing efforts of the Russian government to modernize their own 
nuclear submarine fleet.127 Furthermore, in a world where transferring nuclear weapons across 
land based allies is considered highly dangerous, maintaining regional nuclear deterrence is 
possible with a modernized fleet of nuclear submarines. Also, “Expanding non-strategic weapons 
will also provide Washington with capabilities to enhance extended deterrence and assure allies 
that developing their own nuclear weapons is unnecessary. While the expense of modernizing 
and maintaining the triad is considerable, it pales in comparison with the costs that even a limited 
                                                          
126 Ibid 





nuclear exchange would impose.”128 In addition, a major pro often discussed in previous Obama 
nuclear thinkers, is the idea of creating a more reliable but smaller nuclear arsenal. Modernizing 
is seen as effective in continuing trends of no net arms increases while diminishing the ultimate 
chance of nuclear use. Obama “lieutenants argue that modernizing existing weapons can produce 
a smaller and more reliable arsenal while making their use less likely because of the threat they 
can pose. The changes, they say, are improvements rather than wholesale redesigns, fulfilling the 
president’s pledge to make no new nuclear arms.” If the basis of this policy proposal is 
deterrence, a commitment to no new arms increases but a modernized approach to updating the 
nuclear triad is effective in maintaining Russian deterrence because Russia will realize that 
upgrades to their arsenal will not survive the second strike capabilities of an advanced U.S. 
arsenal. Historical evidence shows that U.S. attack submarines already have superiority to 
Russian nuclear submarines as “American Navy officials and Western analysts say that 
American attack submarines, which are made for speed, endurance and stealth to deploy far from 
American shores, remain superior to their Russian counterparts.”129 Were the U.S. to make 
significant improvements to an already numerical submarine advantage, the qualitative and 
quantitative superiority over Russia’s sea based leg of the nuclear triad may prove difficult to 
counter for an already suffering Russian economy.  
With respect to how modernization has effectively enabled a climate of Russian 
deterrence, there is historical evidence that would suggest that qualitative advantages have 
deescalated US.-Russian conflict previously. Nuclear Modernization efforts throughout the 
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1970’s although not as expansive as this proposal show historical evidence of serving as an 
effective Russian deterrence. “In the 1970s, budget constraints forced the cancellation of the B-
70 bomber; cut the purchase of FB-111s by 70 percent; cut the procurement of Peacekeeper 
missiles by 75 percent, and resulted in 12 fewer ballistic-missile submarines being built than 
originally planned. Despite those cuts, the United States successfully deterred a Soviet Union 
that possessed larger conventional and strategic forces and also concluded several arms-control 
agreements.”130 
Cost undoubtedly is a major aspect of modernization and its reception amongst Congress, 
those in defense circles as well as the general public. In particular, the aspect of this policy 
proposal eliminating plans to modernize the LRSO cruise missile provides a significant benefit 
in cost-savings.  As a result, “In addition to the savings generated by the cancellation of the 
Minuteman III replacement programme and the LRSO cruise missile, the costs associated with 
the warheads for these systems would also be eliminated. Expensive life-extension programmes 
for the W78 and W87 ICBM warheads, and the W80 cruise-missile warhead could be cancelled 
and the warheads retired.”131 From an efficiency standpoint, a pro of double-down on 
modernization also mitigates against risks commonly associated with preserving the life cycle of 
outdated aspects of the current nuclear triad.  The costs associated with a specific series of 
modernization efforts to direct elements of the nuclear triad may outweigh the unknown costs of 
an already aged and stretched nuclear triad. “In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
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characterized the U.S. nuclear arsenal’s long-term prognosis as “bleak.”132 Finally, a benefit that 
the Trump Administration could consider in this proposal is that because of the elimination in 
this proposal of the LRSO cruise missile (a savings of 60 $ Billion Dollars133) would further 
reduce the amount of defense budget consumed by nuclear modernization. The previous Obama 
modernization program calls for a cruise missile upgrade. That modernization program did not 
break away from any historical precedent of how much the nuclear goals of the defense 
department were covered from the defense budget. During a 2016 speech from then Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter, he reiterated how “most people do not realize that spending on the nuclear 
program is a small percentage of total defense spending. At its peak, nuclear spending would 
make up about five percent of the Pentagon's budget, which is now around $600 billion 
annually.”134 
Opposing views suggest that as it relates to the other defense budgetary constraints, the 
costs of nuclear modernization could have significant consequences for maintaining and 
updating various elements of the military. The Arms Control Association notes that if “the Air 
Force and Navy still plan to pursue nuclear modernization programs that will increase spending 
from today’s $18 billion to more than $30 billion per year.”135 This increased level of spending 
has significant consequences across all branches of the military. For example, plans to construct 
a new fleet of Navy ships may have to be eliminated or delayed “to pay for 12 new ballistic 
missile submarines and stay within the current shipbuilding budget.”136 The Committee for a 
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Responsible Federal Budget has already highlighted areas of Trump’s defense spending plans 
and how they would affect the overall fiscal outlook. Missile defense modernization is an area of 
fiscal criticism from CFRB. They note how “These expansions could not be paid for under the 
current defense discretionary spending caps. In part, Trump would pay for them by requiring 
other countries to take more responsibility for their defense needs or reimburse the U.S. for some 
of the defense provided.”137 
Some have noted that the cost-benefit analysis of nuclear modernization identifies a 
trend-line in benefits of upgrading current aspects of the nuclear triad. Evan Montgomery and 
Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments point out figures that point to 
the cost savings of modernization. In their assessment, Montgomery and Harrison point that 
“Fully half of the entire nuclear deterrent funding for the next ten years for the bomber, land 
based missiles and submarines will not be spent on new modern systems to replace our aging 
deterrent but on sustaining our old systems we failed to replace.”138 The problem lies in the fact 
that modernization to our current weapons arsenal has been delayed now for multiple decades. 
Montgomery and Harrison used 10 years as a timeframe snapshot to compare the costs of 
maintaining the current arsenal versus the 10 year aggregate cost of the Obama modernization 
proposal. An advantage of this current policy proposal lies in the statistical findings of Harrison 
and Montgomery in which they note that “to simply sustain the old Triad systems will cost $67.8 
billion over the next decade. This is more than the modernization bill of $67.2 billion.”139 From 
an administrative capacity standpoint, the Trump administration will be pleasantly surprised to 
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hear feedback on how tweaking of federal tax plans can alleviate the costs of a nuclear 
modernization budget proposal. For instance, “Properly done, a pro-growth tax plan can easily 
generate $300 billion more in revenue each year. With unfunded entitlement liabilities 
approaching $100 trillion over the next 70 years, reform in that area is a no-brainer.”140 
While there are certainly various pro’s that can be identified in implementing the policy 
provided in this analysis, there are an array of negative or unintended consequences associated 
with this policy that must be considered. Proponents against reinvigorated nuclear modernization 
have highlighted the counter-productive dimensions of modernization with respect to continuing 
towards a path of Russian-U.S. disarmament. As noted earlier, previous discussions on nuclear 
modernization have “inflamed debate about the depth of the U.S. commitment to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows the United States, Russia, China, the United 
Kingdom, and France to have nuclear weapons if they promise to eventually disarm.”141 
Although previous analysis above notes the positive deterrence results that arise from gains in 
modernization, there is a variety of literature that suggest the negative consequences of a 
modernization policy serve as the catalyst for a new generation of hostile arms competition 
among between Russia and the U.S. Evidence points to trends showing “Countries with nuclear 
weapons have recently embarked on highly ambitious and costly programs, largely unexamined 
outside national security circles, to renew the strategic and tactical weapons in their 
arsenals.”142The danger in engaging in a new era of modernization lies in disrupting the calculus 
set in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which all 
serve as the foundation for creating a world with as few nuclear states as possible. It is worth 
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noting that the latest round of arms reductions through New START does not mandate 
destruction of nuclear weapons but simply place a cap on those warheads of which can be 
deployed. There lies the real potential for deterrence to be in jeopardy as much of the assumption 
in U.S. policy the last several years has been that Russia would not break away from New 
START warhead parameters.  
The assumption from the U.S. policymaking point of view is that so long as continued 
reductions in the arsenal sizes of Russia and the U.S. continue, the Russian advantages in 
deployed warheads would be outweighed by American qualitative superiority with respect to 
nuclear capability. However, up until 2013, analysts have observed that “reductions were at a 
much slower pace than those in the previous five-year period (2008-2013), when Washington 
nixed more than 3,000 weapons and Moscow roughly 2,500 in a spring-cleaning of outdated and 
unreliable arsenals.”143 It is here that the root of this policy is called into question. What is the 
chance that a full-fledged US nuclear modernization does push Russia towards future arms 
reductions talks towards a path to zero? Historical evidence suggests that Russia does not shy 
away from arms-race competition. Current long term forecasting of Russian modernization plans 
show that Moscow has pushed forwards on plans to upgrade all three legs of their nuclear triad. 
As reported in Foreign Policy, “The Russian bomber force is also being upgraded, with plans for 
a relatively slow but super-stealthy flying wing, known as the PAK-DA, apparently going 
forward. A new nuclear- capable cruise missile, long in development, appears to be nearing 
operational status; the new Iskander-M SS-26 short-range tactical nuclear missile—a mobile 
system with two missiles per carrier—is being rolled out, and the Su-34 Fullback fighter-bomber 




is replacing 1970s-era planes as a platform for tactical nuclear strikes.”144 All of this is to say 
that deterrence worldwide could be heavily altered negatively as new states would be observant 
of modernization completion occurring between Russia and the U.S. and be motivated to carry 
out new levels of nuclear testing and scientific development. Although modernization is with the 
goal of deterring a Russian first strike, unavoidable consequences could come in the form of 
rogue states as well as volatile political regimes opting to use nuclear force in regional 
conflict.145  
Often times, nuclear defense and conventional force structuring are said to be two schools 
of thought. However, an objective critique of a plan to modernize all aspects of the nuclear triad 
may have unintended consequences on the administrative capacity of the Defense Department to 
carry out all of its military goals. In particular, the Trump Administration must consider what 
ramifications there are for investing in qualitative superiority from a nuclear modernization 
standpoint while neglecting what is the American best form of superiority in regards to 
conventional military strength. The issue lies that in a 30 year plan for modernization, objectors 
to modernization note that the price tag to complete the transaction for modernization target 
dates in the 2020’s will likely come at the same time that conventional forces are scheduled for 
modernization.146 Opponents of similar modernization packages have stated that costs of 
upgrading the Triad will place increasing pressure on the survivability of other sectors of the 
military and defense apparatus. Kingston Reig of the Arms Control Association has made clear 
in his research that “It also obscures the fact that the plans exceed what the president has deemed 
is required for nuclear deterrence and prioritizing the nuclear mission runs a high risk of forcing 






counterproductive cuts to both nuclear and other defense and national security priorities.”147 
Objectors of steep nuclear modernization have conversely advised previous President Obama to 
focus on sustaining the conventional force advantage the U.S. currently holds over Russia.  
In addition, there are widely held views that a modernization of current forces will not 
necessarily have significant impact on the current deterrence calculus. There are many that 
advocate that a modernization policy will have no direct correlation on impacting Russian 
deterrence due to the view that the U.S. already has a distinct strategic advantage. For example, 
“The number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers for the United States was 794, 
compared to 528 for Russia. There exists a balance in deployed strategic warheads, with the U.S. 
military holding a substantial numerical advantage in the number of deployed strategic delivery 
vehicles. That advantage will persist for many years.”148 Furthermore, the U.S. has not exhausted 
all opportunities for the amounts of warheads that can be deployed SLBM missiles can carry. For 
instance, “All Minuteman III ICBMs have been downloaded to carry a single warhead, even 
though two-thirds of them could carry three.”149  
Steven Pifer points out that even if Russia decides to withdraw from New START and 
increase modernization efforts, the U.S. would still hold overwhelming advantage due to the 
“large number of non-deployed nuclear warheads in storage. If New START were to break 
down, the United States could add hundreds of nuclear warheads-well over 1,000-to its strategic 
ballistic missile force. The Russian strategic ballistic missile force has nowhere near the capacity 
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to match that.”150 What does this mean for policy effectiveness? It raises the question of whether 
or not modernization will truly have an impact on Russia and their nuclear endeavors. Current 
forecasts are already indicating that Russia is well underway with their nuclear modernization 
efforts. A decision to invest hundreds of billions in all three legs of the American triad may not 
have much of a significant impact on the nuclear goals of Russia going forward. Nonetheless, 
Russia still has a difficult road ahead of them in ever reaching close to the nuclear power the 
U.S. possesses. As Pifer notes history is clearly not on the side of Russia. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, “Defense spending crashed, and the Russian military bought little in the way of 
new strategic weapons in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many missiles, such as the SS-18 and SS-
19 ICBMs—which today still carry about one-half of Russia’s deployed strategic warheads—
have reached and passed their service warranty dates.”151 However, if the ultimate goal of a U.S. 
modernization policy is too slow down increases in Russian warheads and nuclear hostility, it 
may be already too late to bring Putin to the negotiating table as absent of Obama era 
modernization, Russia has been full steam ahead on “developing the new Sarmat ICBM, which 
will reportedly be capable of carrying as many as ten-fifteen warheads.”152 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles offer an interesting case study to evaluate the 
negative consequence that a U.S. modernization policy might have in that the U.S. may already 
have qualitative nuclear advantages that have nothing to do with the age of our arsenal. 
Deterrence is focused on the projection of power and what our second strike capabilities are 
coming from all aspects of our trident. SLBM innovation may prove to be wasteful and an 
inefficient allocation of American resources based on historical statistical data we already have 






on Russia/U.S. SLBM operational effectiveness. An example of this is with the Russian Bulava 
SLBM as well as the American Trident D-5 counterpart. As noted by Pifer, “Newer does not 
always equate to better. The Bulava missile has failed in roughly 40 percent of its 21 flight tests 
over the past ten years. The older Trident D-5, on the other hand, has a stunning record of more 
than 140 consecutive successful flight tests.”153 
Cost is always a recurring around the defense community. Plans for nuclear 
modernization undoubtedly have the potential to impose significant cost burdens to the U.S. In 
particular, the Congressional Budget Office has presented significantly different financial 
analyses compared to those conducted by supporters of modernization. In particular, a key 
element to CBO’s February 2017 report is their difference in analysis of how much 
modernization may consume the total budget. Earlier in this report, I cite the works of advocates 
who claim net increased in nuclear consumption to the overall budget would remain stable at 
approximately 5 %. However, in their analysis, the CBO estimates that “Nuclear forces account 
for roughly 6 percent of the total 10-year costs of the plans for national defense outlined last year 
in the departments’ 2017 budget requests, CBO estimates. On an annual basis, that percentage is 
projected to rise from 5 percent in 2017 to slightly less than 7 percent in 2026.”154 Finally, the 
costs associated with acquisition of modernized nuclear weapons may not account for elevated 
costs of maintaining current parts of the nuclear triad of which are to be preserved. While the 
CBO does not have direct costs for these soon to be pending activities, they are certainly threats 
to the defense budget for the foreseeable future. According to CBO, these include the costs of 
“addressing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War (such as dismantling  retired nuclear weapons 
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and cleaning up environmental contamination from past activities at nuclear facilities);  the costs 
of reducing the threat from other countries’ nuclear weapons and the costs of developing and 
maintaining active defenses against other countries’ nuclear weapons (primarily ballistic 
missiles).”155 Some alternatives to alleviate heavy costs have been proposed. Barry Blechman, 
co-founder of the Stimson Center has recommended cost saving policies that coincide elements 
of this policy proposal emphasizing a forego on modernizing cruise missiles. Blechman has 
recommended “continuing plans to build a new strategic bomber, the B-21, with a high priority 
and, assuming it can be kept on schedule and cost, canceling plans to build a new strategic cruise 
missile to arm it.”156 
Political Analysis 
The domestic/international politics of nuclear force modernization are crucial to consider. 
First, John McCain represents a key player in Congress for his often moderate stance on a variety 
of legislative matters. Nonetheless, nuclear modernization is an area where Trump and McCain 
can find political commonalities in their approach towards nuclear force structure ambitions.  
McCain’s support is rooted in establishing a strong nuclear deterrent for NATO. In recent 
Congressional testimony, McCain said, “In light of the most recent developments, it is time for 
the new administration to take immediate action to enhance our deterrent posture in Europe and 
protect our allies. More broadly, we must continue the ongoing modernization of U.S. nuclear 
forces and ensure that NATO’s nuclear deterrence forces are survivable, well-exercised, and 
increasingly ready to counter Russian nuclear doctrine, which calls for the first use of nuclear 
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McCain’s supportive stance towards modernization represents the broad levels of 
bipartisan consensus in Congress supporting a nuclear modernization overhaul. McCain and 
Trump share a common claim that the military was weakened under the Obama administration. 
In his recommendations for the 2018-FY 2022 defense budget, McCain urged members of 
Congress to undergo modernization without delay. McCain specifically highlights various key 
elements of nuclear modernization that should take heightened priority. These include 
maintaining “new START treaty force levels of 400 ICBM’s, 240 submarines launched ballistic 
missiles on 12 nuclear submarines and 60 strategic bombers, replacing the Ohio-class ballistic 
submarine, replacing the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM).”158  
Politically, there are clear indicators that the Trump administration may be able to garner 
significant support for nuclear modernization among key Democrats and Republicans. For 
example, many Democrats’ home districts are geographic locations where nuclear arms are built 
and maintained.  In July of 2016, a bipartisan group of senators, including recent Democrat Vice-
President Candidate Tim Kaine, drafted a letter to the Obama administration backing nuclear 
modernization.159 Within the Democratic party, there are signs of clear ideological schisms 
surrounding nuclear defense spending. During the Democratic National Convention in 
Philadelphia, there were calls to adopt a party platform focusing on “reducing our reliance on 
nuclear weapons while meeting our national security obligations. Democrats will also seek new 
                                                          
157 "Statement by SASC Chairman John McCain on Russia's Deployment of Cruise Missiles in Violation of INF 
Treaty." John McCain. February 14, 2017. https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/2/statement-by-
sasc-chairman-john-mccain-on-russia-s-deployment-of-cruise-missiles-in-violation-of-inf-treaty. 
158 McCain, John . "Restoring American Power." Senate Armed Services Committee. 
https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-
power-7.pdf. 




opportunities for further arms control and avoid taking steps that create incentives for the 
expansion of existing nuclear weapons programs. To this end, we will work to reduce excessive 
spending on nuclear weapons-related programs that are projected to cost $1 trillion over the next 
30 years.”160 The Trump administration may be able to leverage the fact that there are underlying 
disagreements within the Democratic party on nuclear modernization in to mobilize SASC 
ranking member,  Jack Reed (Rhode Island), as well as, Mark Warner as two key Democrats 
who support efforts to update the nuclear triad.  
Historical evidence points to past cycles of partisan politics playing a significant role in 
inefficiencies in modernizing the nuclear arsenal. The political structures of government today 
represent the dangers of delaying modernization as well as the risks associated with an 
administration not laying out clear budgetary requirements to each aspect of modernization. The 
Center for American Progress describes the typical process for modernization budget layouts. 
Initially, there is coordination between the President and the Pentagon; then, “officially the 
process ends here. The executive branch assumes that Congress will appropriate the funding 
necessary to allow the services to procure the requested inventory of systems.”161  However, 
there are problems with the simplicity of this model. In short, “this model does not allow the 
executive branch to account for political and fiscal pressures that may prevent the services from 
procuring the nuclear force that targeting analysis implied.”162   
The potential for the Trump Administration to link back specific pros of modernization 
from an international security, as well as, the budget cost to the Obama administration is a 
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significant source of political capital that can be leveraged in gaining bipartisan support for 
controversial modernization programs. Furthermore, linking the goals of modernization to the 
perceptions of other political actors around the globe is critical in demonstrating to Democrats 
and Republicans the urgency of modernization overhaul goals. Ultimately, the goal of this policy 
is to reduce nuclear arsenal buildup while also isolating the ability of nuclear use across the 
limited handful of current nuclear states. Preserving bipartisan support in Congress is possible 
through a commitment to defining modernization as a means to prevent a future international 
crisis if states with nuclear arms find themselves in conflicts with American allied states. As 
Scher points out, “preserving this stability provides insurance against the fear and confusion that 
would accompany any serious military crisis under the nuclear shadow.”163  
The Trump Administration is now facing a variety of push-back with their hesitancy to 
take firm stances against Russia in matters of national security, Russian election interference, the 
Syrian conflict, as well as, a Luke-warm posture towards Vladimir Putin. Politically, one way to 
contribute towards softening those tensions among the American public, the media, and 
Democratic members of Congress is through a robust modernization program aimed at deterring 
Russia from engaging in escalated conflict in areas of strategic interest to the U.S. The July 8, 
2016 bipartisan letter sent to Defense Secretary Ash Carter specifically calls for swift action 
regarding developing clear goals for modernization across the next five years. In their letter, 14 
Democratic and Republican Senate members lay out a macro-scale policy objective by adopting 
a long term modernization plan. For instance, the letter outlines the three main rationales for 
updating all three legs of the nuclear triad. It states: “The Sea leg's unparalleled stealth introduces 
uncertainty into any adversary attempt to threaten the U.S. or its interests. The Air leg provides 
                                                          




us with the flexibility to deploy deterrent assets, signaling intent and demonstrating resolve to 
both adversaries and allies alike.”164 By referring to previous reasoning demonstrated in 
bipartisan circles, bipartisan support can prove to be advantageous for an administration 
currently operating under low-approval ratings.165 The bi-partisan support presented in the July 
2016 Senate letter to Carter has the ability to provide undecided Democratic leadership with the 
appropriate party cover (Tim Kaine) needed to support long range nuclear modernization 
proposals despite opposition coming from senior Democratic leadership, such as, Elizabeth 
Warren.166 
The Republican Party has long been an advocate of the U.S. spearheading international 
peace through a strong projection of force. The political advantage of a nuclear modernization is 
that a commitment to restoring aged portions of the Triad can assist in alleviating fears among 
Republican circles of a softening on American nuclear power. Part of the success during the 
previous administration’s push to ratify New START were members of the Obama Cabinet 
reassuring Republicans that arsenal downsizing would be accompanied by future commitments 
to nuclear modernization. In effect, the policy proposal prescribed in this analysis is aimed at 
catering to both sides of the political spectrum in pursuing a modernization/no first use policy 
that motivates the Russians to negotiate for future cuts. This type of policy is heavily favored by 
Democrats as set by the previous Obama administration precedent. However, modernization 
caters to Republicans whom were hesitant about a New START arms reduction treaty that may 
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or may not have been accompanied by US commitments to bolster all three legs of the nuclear 
triad.  
Members of the defense community establishment, past congressional leaders, and key 
actors will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in the framing of a modernization/no first use policy. 
Similar to the approach of the Obama administration in rallying widespread bipartisan support 
for New START ratification from past government officials, the Trump Administration has the 
potential to rally support from previous defense, congressional and foreign policy elites as well. 
In a sense, modernization and no use can be used to frame a policy that sets the precedent for 
future arms reductions negotiations with Russia that has proven to already show such widespread 
approval. In his book, Getting to 67: The Post-Cold War Politics of Arms Control Treaty 
Ratification, Patrick Homan identifies areas where Obama was able to exploit widespread 
bipartisan support for his nuclear policy agenda.  With respect to New START, “officials from 
the past seven administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, testified before Senate 
committees in support of the treaty. In fact, the number of Republicans who testified 
outnumbered Democrats. These endorsements included nearly every luminary within the 
American foreign policy establishments of both political parties, including all six living 
Secretaries of State from Republican administrations, from Henry Kissinger to Condoleezza 
Rice.”167 A similar trend with regards to widespread support of modernization from key foreign 
policy and defense elites is evident today. Former Defense Secretary Bill Perry, Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative 
are examples members of the defense community establishment that have advocated previously 
for modernization. The opinions and views of these previous administration officials holds 
                                                          




significant weight in assessing the potential impact on this proposal as current members of 
congress often lean on previous generations of government leaders to formulate their voting 
decisions when it comes time to vote for defense appropriation bills.  
In a 2010 statement of Dr. Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
the New Start Treaty, Kissinger expressed support for the US ability to engage in unilateral 
modernization while still remaining within the confines of future arms control agreements. 
Kissinger added that “as part of a number of recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, 
George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a repaired and 
modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and added resources for the three national 
laboratories. We expressed this view in a statement of January 20, 2010, as follows: 
"Maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of these 
weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in 
nonproliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction goals…Departures from our existing 
stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure 
and effective deterrent." In determining what is essential, I believe that great weight 
should be given to the findings of the bipartisan Schlesinger-Perry Commission: "So long 
as modernization proceeds within the framework of existing U.S. policy, it should 
encounter minimum political difficulty."168  
Furthermore, the historical handling of modernization and the fiscal pressures that come 
along with delaying modernization are critical for the Trump administration. Ronald Reagan 
heavily criticized Jimmy Carter for failing to expedite plans to build the B-1 bomber. As a result, 
Reagan increased the defense budget by 28 % to construct both the B-1 and B-2 bombers.  
However, this did not come without backlash for the George H.W. Bush administration in his 
deterrence goals. “The rapid rise in defense spending helped to provoke the first sequester in 
1985, which depressed the defense budget 10 percent in real terms during the second term of the 
                                                          
168 "Statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee On the New Start Treaty." 




Reagan administration. Tightened budgets and the end of the Cold War caused the George H.W. 
Bush administration to reduce the number of B-2s to 75 and, eventually, to 21.”169 
The role of interest groups as well as think tank’s in shaping public opinion and an 
administration’s vision for a policy are critical pieces of the political dynamic surrounding this 
policy proposal. The Heritage Foundation is a major conservative think tank, based in 
Washington, D.C. that has ambitious goals of leaving its mark on various domestic and foreign 
policy goals of the Trump administration. An issue the Trump administration will face is the 
already rocky relationship that exists between the traditionally conservative think tank and the 
Trump ideologies that have shown a tendency to deviate away from establishment conservative 
values. Healthcare reform has already proven to be a major test of the relationship between The 
Heritage Foundation and Trump. Reports have recently surfaced indicating that the Trump 
“Obamacare” repeal legislation “runs completely afoul of Heritage’s priorities and threatens to 
upend a critical relationship between conservative activists and the Trump administration.”170 
However, Heritage has a longstanding track record of staunch support for modernization. In a 
recent conversation with Michela Dodge, senior defense policy analyst at Heritage, she 
mentioned that her organization is recommending three distinct nuclear policies for the Trump 
administration. These include withdrawing from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty; 
withdrawing from New START; and congressional funding for long term nuclear 
modernization.171 It is widely noted that “The Heritage Foundation is closer to Trump world than 
any other administration since that of Ronald Reagan, a relationship cultivated as part of a 
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strategy to give it deep influence. DeMint has strong ties to Vice President Mike Pence. The two 
have been friends since they served in the House together. Pence also spoke at a Heritage event 
late last year.”172 Due to the current strained relationship, the Trump administration currently has 
with Heritage over healthcare reform; there is uncertainty over whether there will be similar 
frictions over policies of strategic arms.  
There are ways in which the Trump Administration may be able to garner public support 
for nuclear modernization by emphasizing using nuclear strength as a means to not strain 
conventional forces. In his book, History as Policy, Robert O’Neill touches on the hostilities 
American’s may have to leading conventional forces into troubled foreign zones. He notes that 
“At present, and in the near future, the US Government is going to require more military 
resources to commit in troubled areas with possibly fewer allies contributing effective forces. 
This crunch could well coincide with a period in which public opinion in the United States will 
be more critical of Presidential policies of foreign intervention.”173 Scholars have noted that 
“recent qualitative studies on the relationship between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy put 
decisions into the following two categories: the President tends to lead or to follow public 
opinion; public opinion influences decision-making, constrains the decision or has no impact.”174  
Opposition 
As previously indicated, evidence points to a strong list of key actors, groups and ex-
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government officials who would support modernization. However, it is also worth noting the 
individuals, groups and possible members of the public that would be opposed to the policies laid 
out in this analysis.  Foreign governments represent a section of international stakeholders that 
may share conflicting views on US decisions to expedite major nuclear modernization programs.  
Within the context of nuclear modernization and the ultimate goal of extended deterrence, the 
political ramifications , with respect to foreign governments and their response to US nuclear 
modernization, are critical to consider. Specifically, the Trump Administration must consider 
how the possible implementations of nuclear modernization policies affect the optics of the long- 
standing relationships of NATO allies to the United States. Particularly, the commitment the US 
projects of nonproliferation among the various NATO states.  Russian hostilities towards US 
modernization have the potential to create diplomatic and political tensions among Russia and 
NATO allies.  The scenario is as such: if the US moves forward towards a policy of nuclear 
modernization, what new tensions will that create for Russia to move nuclear weapons into 
Eastern European regions? Politically and diplomatically this has the potential to create a volatile 
environment with the US and the NATO states of which it is looking to supply extended 
deterrence. Recent reports have already indicated early signs of political and national security 
tensions. “The U.S. has recently deployed a missile defense system in Romania and is building a 
second base in Poland. U.S. and European officials say those sites are to defend against potential 
ballistic launches from Iran, but Zwack says that Russia views them as provocations. The new 
Polish missile defense site would be within range of the Iskander, adds Lewis.”175  
Scholars have pointed out the growing fears regarding the erosion of the US nuclear 
                                                          





umbrella in Europe. As Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn of the Royal United Services 
Institute point out, “debates on nuclear weapon policy are, perhaps inevitably, strongly political 
and symbolic-theological even-in character.”176 The political ramifications of US modernization 
and how that may affect the NATO response is worth considering as cold-war tensions appear to 
be a hallmark of the new post 9/11 Eastern Europe geopolitical environment. With recent 
Russian annexation of Crimea, the perception of what role NATO wishes for US nuclear 
weapons to be held in Eastern Europe could shift. As noted by Chalmers and Lunn, “with the end 
of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, nuclear weapons have assumed a lower profile in 
NATO strategy. NATO has unilaterally reduced the number of American nuclear warheads and 
short range delivery systems in Europe.”177 Furthermore, political complications may arise from 
this policy in that a US commitment to a nuclear no first use policy may complicate NATO 
leadership perceptions of the effectiveness of the US nuclear umbrella and to what extent the US 
would be willing to use any level of nuclear force no matter how aggressive Russian 
encroachments into various European regions become. A no first use policy mixed with a 
resurgence US modernization could create a volatile intentional political climate for the US and 
NATO member states. Russia is reportedly moving missile sites deeper into Eastern European 
regions creating fears among NATO member states of further military violence from Russia 
which may create a desire among NATO to rely on the US ability to engage in first-use nuclear 
strikes. From an effectiveness standpoint, the scenarios expressed above raise the question of if 
modernization can really deliver effective deterrence if Russia has already shown a willingness 
to engage militarily with Crimea without fear of an American first strike.  
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Scott Sagan of Stanford University alludes to these complex set of geo-political issues. 
He states that “The newer NATO member states and Turkey are particularly concerned about 
any change in NATO doctrine that they believe would signify a reduced commitment to joint 
defense on the part of the United States.”178 There are international political dangers of the US 
choosing to continue on a path of ambiguity, particularly with delays in the modernization of 
forces and the subsequent deployment of those forces in Eastern Europe. Sagan notes that 
“Advocates of calculated ambiguity maintain that such threats usefully enhance deterrence 
because they raise the potential costs any government would face if it considered using chemical 
or biological weapons.”179 Sagan forecasts the potential for a president to “feel increased 
pressure to use nuclear weapons to maintain his or her domestic reputation and America’s 
international reputation for honoring commitments.”180 
Apart from political actors in and outside of the U.S., advocacy organizations play a 
considerable role in shaping public opinion on nuclear modernization.  The Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS) is a publically funded, non-profit group that focuses on pressing issues on 
defense, global climate change among many others. The UCS has played a pivotal role in 
voicing opposition to Obama Administration modernization goals as well as displaying 
opposition to already existing programs aimed at replacing current aging warheads. Additionally, 
UCS has previously raised concerns about the costs of Obama modernization proposals, the same 
proposals used to formulate this policy proposal. For instance, with respect to cost, “Based on the 
administration’s own cost estimates, we find there is no reason to believe that 3+2 would be less 
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expensive than refurbishing existing weapons; indeed, it may actually be a more expensive 
approach.”181 Furthermore, UCS bases much of their modernization disproval around the global 
political ramifications that could follow the development of new nuclear weapons and the 
subsequent testing that may be required" to validate their effectiveness. Ultimately, “if the 
United States did resume nuclear testing, it could encourage a resumption of testing by other 
nuclear-armed nations, ending an international moratorium that benefits U.S. security.”182 
Subsequently, a system of trade-offs has to be considered as it relates to the global perception of 
other nuclear and non-nuclear starts view of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and the 
NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty).183 
Recommendation 
Given the following analysis outlined in this document, I recommend for the Trump 
Administration to pursue a policy of nuclear modernization, modernizing all three legs of the 
nuclear triad over a thirty year period. The first major consideration to make is that from a cost 
standpoint, the cost of modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal is much less than the cost of 
engaging in a prolonged armed conflict with another regional actor. A large proportion of 
negative rhetoric focuses on the percentage of the defense budget absorbed by future 
modernization costs. Air Force General John Hyten, Commander of the United States Strategic 
Command recently stated that “Deterrence will always be cheaper than war, and there is nothing 
                                                          






more expensive than losing a war.”184 While ideological in its tone, this statement reflects the 
challenges the U.S. has recently encountered when engaging in long standing regional conflicts.  
Claims of a trillion dollar budgetary requirement necessary to fund a thirty year project are 
arguably far-fetched and an exaggeration of the true costs of multi-layered modernization. 
Before leaving office, Ash Carter stated that “Over the next two decades, I expect the total cost 
of nuclear modernization to be approximately $270 billion. Although this presents a long-term 
affordability challenge for DoD, I believe we must fund the enterprise to ensure that our nuclear 
deterrent continues to provide the President options and remains as safe, secure, and reliable as it 
is today.”185  Preserving a strong nuclear deterrent is more paramount than ever. The constant 
advantage the U.S. has had through the Post WWII and Cold-War period was the advantage in 
overwhelming nuclear force. Trends are indicating that regimes are pushing further away from 
traditional modes of war and engaging more often in irregular conflict. Irregular conflict has 
been a major component of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. According to recent CBO report, 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars by the end of 2017 will have cost U.S. taxpayers upwards of 2.4 $ 
trillion dollars.186 Given the current tensions escalating around the globe ranging from Eastern 
Europe to North Korea, the idea of immersing already exhausted American troops in a further 
protracted armed conflict would be reckless and irresponsible.  
Nuclear modernization at its core represents a fiscally responsible and feasible alternative 
to the norms of the previous two administrations that have continued to commit troops to Middle 
                                                          
184 Garamone, Jim. "Stratcom Commander Makes Case for Modernizing Nuclear Triad." U.S. Department of 
Defense. March 31, 2017. https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1137610/stratcom-commander-makes-
case-for-modernizing-nuclear-triad/. 
185 Reif, Kingston. "U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs." Arms Control Association. February 2017. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization. 




East conflict without proving clear goals for full scale troop withdrawal. Conversely, Hyten has 
reiterated that “We have to increase [spending] somewhere between 2.5 and 3 percent,” he said. 
“That leaves 94 percent of our defense budget to do the things we have to. When you think of the 
survival of our nation -- and I think that is the most important reason we have a military … the 
backstop of all of that is the nuclear enterprise.”187 Furthermore, former Defense Secretary Ash 
Carter holds significant credibility when providing his forecasting of modernization costs. As 
noted by the National Institute of Public Policy, currently “nuclear weapons and their supporting 
systems cost about $16 billion per year, or only three percent of the annual defense budget.”188 
Advocates of total nuclear disbarment fail to point out the historically low levels of defense 
budget funds being used to currently fund the nuclear triad. Furthermore, “spending only three 
percent on the nuclear arsenal is historically below average, and modernization plans would just 
bring expenses to their historical norm.”189 Additionally, the harsh reality is that pursuing a 
policy of exclusively cutting nuclear arms without modernizing could create costs that 
impossible to anticipate from a geo-political standpoint as well. If the U.S. fails to modernize, 
how will our close NATO allies as well as Japan and South Korea react to reoccurring 
aggression from China, Russia and North Korea? “Cutting the U.S. nuclear arsenal further would 
likely embolden Russia and China, damage relations with allies, and drive allies to examine 
obtaining nuclear weapons themselves. These are costly possibilities indeed.”190  
Upgrades to the current nuclear arsenal are also cost effective in their ability to retain 
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effectiveness for decades to come of which will provide the U.S. flexible strategic options in the 
face of potential future military conflicts. Operational effectiveness is one of best features of this 
modernization plan. While impossible to say for certain what the international political climate 
will look like thirty years from now, the Arms Control Association can confirm that 
modernization of the current set of Minuteman III ICBM’s would be operationally effective 
through the 2080’s.191 Today’s congressional landscape is marked by restricted budgets and 
finite resources. There is no opportunity more prudent than today to afford the U.S. the ultimate 
flexibility in handling future conflicts.  
Further evidence is pointing that the generally positive and optimistic climate that 
followed the Cold-War has long diminished .“Both Russia and China see great value in nuclear 
weapons to support expansionist foreign policies and they show zero interest in reductions.192 
Evidence of this trend is becoming increasingly clear. “Russia’s doctrine today is not a replay of 
“stable mutual deterrence or NATO flexible response doctrine. No, it includes nuclear coercion 
based on selective nuclear first use threats in non-nuclear contingencies.”193 If the U.S. is to 
expect a continuation of the worldwide non-proliferation regime, modernization must occur to 
alleviate the threats that Russia continues to perpetuate by virtue of their own commitment to 
modernize.194 Furthermore, given today’s heightened tensions with Russia it is uncertain if 
Russia will ever be willing to return to the negotiating table for future arms cuts.  Former 
Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller has been firm in his support for 
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upgrading the triad.  He noted that “because the United States will retain a diverse triad of 
strategic forces, any Russian cheating under New START would have little effect on the assured 
second strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces.”195 Moreover, there are direct qualitative 
advantages that each leg of the triad holds in its future modernization. Baker Spring and Michela 
Dodge summarize the advantages of modernizing each leg of the triad from a military strategic 
standpoint. In their analysis they note that “ICBMs are the cheapest, most reliable leg of the U.S. 
triad and can respond faster to a threat than any other leg of the triad. Heavy bombers allow 
policymakers to display policy intent and can be dispersed among bases to increase survivability, 
and they provide a wider range of yield options. Submarines can be deployed to demonstrate 
intent, and are the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad.”196 The survivability of current 
nuclear forces is in serious jeopardy as former Defense Secretary referred to the current state of 
U.S. nuclear forces as “bleak”.197 This analysis strongly agrees with Gates’ assessment that the 
U.S. “must take steps to transform from an aging Cold War nuclear weapons complex that is too 
large and too expensive to a smaller, less costly, but modern enterprise that can meet our nation’s 
nuclear security needs for the future.”198 A commitment to modernization ensures that the 
survivability and flexibility of U.S. nuclear forces are never called into question. As of now, the 
U.S. has not engaged in any nuclear testing since 1992. The current components of the nuclear 
triad were arguably not built to last past their upcoming extended lifetimes. As Gates points out, 
“At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially 
in light of our testing moratorium.  It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because 
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eventually we won’t have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have.”199   
Finally, as discussed earlier, the ability for modernization to supply extended deterrence 
throughout the Middle East, Pacific region and Eastern Europe is a core element of this policy 
proposal. Bluntly, if Russia ever decided to use nuclear force against a rival state, American 
extended deterrence has deeply failed. As Evan Montgomery of CSBA notes, “Russia’s 
piecemeal efforts to restore its lost continental empire, China’s military expansion in its near seas 
and beyond, and Iran’s willingness to both create and fill power vacuums throughout its 
neighborhood all suggest that “geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage.”200 A 
comprehensive modernization plan reduces the probability of allied states engaging in their own 
modernization goals. While the potential for future arms reductions with Russia is bleak given 
the current geo-political landscape the US cannot afford to wait on the hopes of Russia pursuing 
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